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- l  -I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
l.  Bonn's  reactions  to  the  EEC  crisis 
At  first  the  German  Government  was  loth to  comment  on  the 
failure  of  the  EEC  Council  to  reach  agreement  on  the  EEC  Commis-
sion proposals  for  financing  the  common  agricultural  policy. 
At  the  German  Crafts Congress  in Bonn,  Chancellor Erhard 
counselled  calm  and  collectedness.  Government  circles were  satis-
fied  that  t:~e  fault ·did  not  lie with  Germany.  Although  the  German 
delegation was  not  allowed  full  latitude at  the Brussels negotia-
tions,  in ac8ordance with  the  special wishes  of  the Free Demo-
crats,  there  proved  to  be  no  need  to  ask  for  a  broader  mandate  or 
to refer back  to Bonn  for  further  instructions.  In fact  the  talks 
foundered  on  the Italian refusal  to  discuss  the  financial  machin8-
ry  of  the Agricultural Fund  except  on  a  year-to-year basis. It 
was  po~nted out  in Bonn  that  the Franco-German understanding, 
worked  out  prior  to  the  talks,  was  operative  on  the Council  of 
::::.nisters.  The  Bonn  view  was  that  when  the  negotiations  broke 
du::n,  over  a  third  oi'  the  issues  had  already  been dealt with,  so 
t:;:::t  with  calm  and  patience  and  with  the  help of  the  Permanent 
?epresentatives  a  compromise  could  have  been  reached  on  the  points 
outEtandin~.  The  only  criticism of France's attitude,  was  that  she 
~:::d  not  kept  the  undertaking  she  gave  at  the  preliminary discus-
sions,  na~ely that  the French  Government  would  not  insist  on  the 
3:  cT 1J.ne  0e2.d-line  but  WOUld,  if need  be,  c·Ontinue  the  talkS  after 
th~t date.  Since France's  representative was  in  the  chair  on  the 
,~ounr:il,  it would  have  been quite  easy  to  :arry  forward  the  time-
::_::..r.r.i t  for  the  talks. 
Concern was  expressed  in Bonn at  the  news  that France  would 
take  no  fu1·ther  part  in  the  agri::ul  tural  .j is  ·~ussions  for  the  tirr.e 
being.  ::r.  Schmur:ker,  Economi "S  Minister,  had  suggested,  when  the 
talks broke  down,  that  a  further  meeting  be  r:alled  fbr  mid-July. 
The  Brussels  crisis  and  its  implications were  discussed  on 
l  July  1965  at  a  coalition meeting  unde~ the  chairmanship  of 
Chancellor Erhard;  special attention was  given  to  the  reports  of 
the Brussels  negotiators.  The  original  purpose  of  the Coalition 
discussion was  to  define  the  negotiating  mandate  for  the  German 
delegation;  the  FDP  was  particularly insistent that  German  agree-
ment  on  financing  the agricultural  fund  depended  upon  market  or-
ganizations  being  discussed  (especially for  milk  and  sugar). 
After  the  meeting,  the Chairman  of  the  FDP  Group,  Mr.  Kuhlmann-
Stumm,  stated that  he  deeply regretted the Brussels  breakdown; 
this was  due,  in his  opinion,  to  the  isolation that Fran°e  had 
brought  upon  itself. 
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When  it was  announced  that  the French Council  of Ministers 
intended  to  draw  the  legal,  economic  and  political inferences 
from  the  collapse  of  the  agricultural talks  in Brussels,  Secre-
tary  of State,  Mr.  von Hase,  stated:  "There  is  .::till  a  hope  that 
the  obviously great  disappointment  in Paris will be  followed  by 
reflection and  that  the  situation will sort itself out.  The 
Foreign Affairs  Committee  of  the Bundestag approved  the  line 
taken by  the  German  Government  at  the Brussels  talks  and  it was 
again urged  that  the  powers  of  the  E~ropean Parliament  had  to  be 
reinforced as  the  EEC  developed." In this  connexion,  r.:r.  von Ease 
quoted  Mr.  Couve  de Murville,  the French Foreign  M~nister,  ~ho 
said  that  the  collapse  of  the  talks  "was  not  a  drama  but  a 
crisis".  He  added  that  the  position of  the  German  Government 
would  be  unchanged  in  future  negotiations.  T 1Ir.  von  Hase  de:-,iec 
reports  that  new  German/Dutch  proposals  for  overcoming  the  ':ri.sis 
were  to  be  expected.  The  German  Government  awaited  the  proposal.:: 
of  the  EEC  Commission. 
At  the  llth Congress  of  the  Social  Committees  of  the 
Christian Democrat  ~mployees'  Organization  (lO-ll July  1965), 
Dr.  s~hroeder,  the Foreign Minister,  said that  the  German  Govern-
~ent supported  the  SEC  Commission  proposals  and  that  the  six 
countries  had,  despite  many  difficulties,  made  great  progress 
towards  a  common  market.  There were  lengthy  talks  in Bonn  ~ith 
Mr.  Saragat,  the Italian Head  of  State,  and  Mr.  Fanfani,  the 
Italian Foreign Minister,  about  the Brussels  crisis and  further 
bilateral talks were  to  be  held. 
At  a  press  conference  held after  the  collapse  of  the Brussels 
talks,  Dr.  Hallstein,  President  of  the  EEC  Commission,  stated that 
it was  now  better for  the Council  of Ministers  to  bide  its time 
and  stay together.  It was  not  true  to  say  that it would  not  have 
been  possible  for  the Council  to  reach  agreement.  In fact,  a 
solution was  within reach  half-way  through  the negotiations  and 
all the  Member  States  had  contributed  to  that  ;::olution.  The  lack 
of  success  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  time  factor  had  been 
underestimated. 
After  the  two-hour  talks  in Brussels  between Federal Chan-
cellor Erhard  and  Professor Hallstein,  President  of  the  EEC  Com-
mission,  no  communique  was  published.  When  the  talks  on  financing 
the  agricultural regulation broke  down,  the  German  Government  was 
first  informed  of  the  Commission  standpoint  by  Mr.  von  der  Groeben, 
a  member  of  the  EEC  Commission.  The  focal  point  of  the Bonn  dis-
cussions  was  the situation following  the French withdrawal  from 
the Council  of Ministers  and  other bodies  in Brussels.  After dis-
cussions with Dr.  Hallstein,  the  German  Government  held fast  by 
its first  statement  that it would  leave it to  the  initiative of 
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the  EEC  Commission  to  make  fresh  proposals.  This  was  regarded  in 
Bonn  not  only as  the  most  appropriate but  also  as  the  most  poli-
tic solution.  (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung;  2,  ~'  9,  12  and 
16 July  1965) 
2.  Mr.  Luns  and  the  European  crisis 
In an  interview with  the West  German  weekly 
11Der  Spiegel
11
, 
Mr.  Luns  made  the  following  comments  on  the  current  crisis  in the 
European  Economic  Community  and  the  pos~tion of  the  Dutch  Govern-
ment  with regard  to  European  co-operation in general: 
"Der  Spiegel":  Do  you  think General  de  Gaulle will  take 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  impugn  the very spirit of  the 
Treaty which we  have  just discussed?  Do  you  think his ultimate 
aim  is  to  prevent  majority  decisions  being  taken  after  l  January 
1966?  The  majority rule is obviously a  most  unwelcome  prospect 
for  him. 
Mr.  Luns:  I  think  - indeed,  I  know  - that  the  idea  of  a 
majority rule is rather unpopular with  the French.  Furthermore, 
the French  Government  is  keeping aloof  from  the  EEC  Commission 
and  from  the  supranational  concepts  of  certain Member  countries. 
All  this  is well-known.  However,  I  personally do  not  think  that 
the French  Government  is attacking  the  spirit of  the Treaty  or 
the Institutions.  The  French  have  a  sense  of political reality; 
they are very  clever,  very  intelligent.  I  particularly appreciate 
the  lucid and  analytical  mind  of  my  French  colleague  and  friend, 
Mr.  Couve  de  Murville .... 
11Der  Spiegel":  We  were  also  appreciative of  these traits 
when  Mr.  Couve  de  Murville was  ambassador  to Bonn. 
Mr.  Luns:  ..•  his analytical mind,  his  realism and  dry  humour. 
This  is why  I  doubt  that we  shall reach  such  extremes.  The  French 
know  that  the result would  be  a  very  serious  crisis with  the 
Federal Republic  of  Germany,  Italy and  the Netherlands,  and  even 
with Belgium  and  Luxembourg. 
"Der  Spiegel":  The  fact  remains  that we  should  know  - hence 
our question  - whether we  have  now  come  to  a  point where  one  can 
no  longer  ignore  the basic  question of  determining  to  what  extent 
the  idea  of  a  Europe  of States  is  compatible with  the  Community 
spirit. 
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Mr.  Luns:  If you  are  asking  me  whether  this  crucial  point 
has  already been  reached,  then I  would  say that we  are very near, 
but  I  can still see  no  possibility,  through  a  reasonable  compro-
mise  between  the Six,  of  renewed  co-operation that would  prevent 
a  further  crisis. 
"Der  Spiegel":  What  do  you  mean  by  "reasonable  compromise"? 
Mr.  Luns:  Here  I  must  be  very  careful,  not  only because 
caution is necessary  for  political reasons,  but  also because  the 
Netherlands  are  convinced  that we  must  not  take  the  place  of  the 
EEC  Commission.  It is  for  the latter to  put  forward  new  ideas 
and  proposals. 
11Der  Spiegel":  What  we  should  like to  know  is whether,  be-
cause  of  the General  or  because  of  circumstances,  we  have  come 
to  the  point where  the  problem  can  no  longer  be  avoided. 
Mr.  Luns:  There  is nothing  to  say  that we  shall  come  to  that 
point  - unless  the  General  sticks  to  his  political concepts  of 
Europe,  the  Commission  and  th8  function  of  the  EEC. 
"Der  Spiegel":  What  would  happen,  in your  opinion,  if he 
did?  Would  the  merger  of  the  Communities  become  impossible? 
Mr.  Luns:  In that  case  the  merger  would  presumably  become, 
as  you  say,  impossible. 
"Der Spiegel":  Do  you  think it would  be  possible for  the 
economic  organization to  continue  to  operate  and  for  economic 
integration only  to  go  on,  let us  say  "at  a  slow  pace",  while 
political  integration would  be  put  off  to  a  later date,  i.e. 
until such  time  as  the  General retired from  political life? 
Mr.  Luns:  This  is quite  possible.  We,  the Dutch,  have  always 
believed  - and  I  think we  are  not  the  only  ones  - that  economic 
integration should necessarily lead  to  political integration.  The 
Marxists  think  so  too,  and  to  them it is  a  principle.  But  we  have 
realized that  the actual course  of  events  has  taken  a  different 
turn.  General  de  Gaulle  has  never  aimed at political integration. 
Admittedly  he  envisages  close  political co-operation,  centralized 
but  not  integrated;  he  would  like this  co-operation to  be  based 
on nations  and States,  but  not  on  supranationality. 
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"Der Spiegel":  This  is true.  One  could,  it would  appear, 
speak of  the  ambiguity of  the General's  policy.  He  has  clearly 
attempted  to  apply  a  brake,  through his  concept  of political 
co-operation based  on  the States,  to  the  development  of  the 
Communities  towards  an  integrated Europe. 
Mr.  Luns:  This  could  be  said. 
"Der Spiegel":  It now  remains  to  be  seen whether all the 
other  partners will be  capable  of upholding  the  principle of in-
tegration over  General  de  Gaulle's  particular  concept  of  closer 
political co-operation. 
Mr.  Luns:  We  are not  against  some  co-operation,  but  we  do 
not  want  a  small  and  inward-looking European  political bloc, 
based  on  the  idea of States.  We  refuse  to  contribute  to  the 
setting up  of  such  a  bloc.  As  I  said earlier on,  we  must  always 
consider  the  possibility of  further  steps  towards  integration. 
We  have  never  ceased  to  affirm this,  even at  the  time  when  Great 
Britain applied  for  membership  of  the  EEC.  But  in so  far  as  this 
political  community  should remain  outward-looking  - and while  I 
referred  to  Great Britain,  I  was  also  thinking of other  coun-
tries  - we  are  fully  prepared  to  go  much  further  than has  been 
done  up till now. 
"Der  Spiegel":  The  problem is  thus  as  follows:  on  the  one 
hand  de  Gaulle wants  to  prevent  integration,  on  the  other his 
policy is aiming at the  creation of  some  kind  of  closed  conti-
nental European bloc,  designed  to  be  a  bar  to  those who  - like 
you  and  like the Federal Chancellor  - consider  that Europe  should 
not  be  a  third force  but  should remain  capable  of  very  close 
co-operation within  the  framework,  for  instance,  of Atlantic 
alliance. 
Mr.  Luns:  We  are  also against  the  idea  of  a  third force 
because we  believe that  even  such  large  and  powerful  countries 
as  France,  the Federal Republic  and  Great Britain could not  form 
a  bloc  that would  be  comparable  to  the United States or  the 
Soviet Union.  This  could  perhaps  be  done  if the whole  of  Europe 
were  integrated,  if its economic  development  reached  an  exception-
ally high  lev~l and if it spent  much  more  on its defence  than it 
is doing at  present.  But  this would  be  contrary  to  the  concepts 
of France,  which  intends  to  found  everything  on  the States and 
refuses  any weakening  of its sovereignty •.•  (Der  Spiegel,  No.  2, 
4  August  1965) 
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3.  State::.eut  by  i11r.  Pompidou  on  ti1e  Brussels  ,;risis 
In  a  televised talk given  on  27  July,  the  ~~en h  Pri~e 
Ivlinister  dealt  in particular with  the Agricultural  Cor:t'1Qn  '<c-:2'\<:et. 
After  having briefly  ~e~alled the  object  of  the  agr~c;lt~~al ne-
gotiations  in Br"ssels,  he  stated:  "All we  r:oulc':  cio  wa~:  to  ~1ote 
the  breakdown.  As  for  the  future,  we  shall  just  wa~t 2nd  0ee: 
there  is  a  solution to  everything  and  we  shall  ,c;oon  know  T";ha t  ·~an 
be  done.  The  fact  remains,  however,  that if there  ~~  to  bs  2 
Common  Marl{et  then  there  must  be  an  Ag;:·i""L'ltural  Co:~::;;J~l  ·'T~~,=c:>t 
and  a  fair  fina.n-·ial  regulation.  We  shall  defin_;_ :ely ceo:  ;j -:·~·<C~'"  ",:;,) 
the whole  of  the Fren ·h  economy  being  ccmtrollec  fro:-:1  o~:-.  2.L 
the  Government  being unable  to  discharge  its dutie:::  +:o~·.·~  the 
French  people.  Common  sense warns  us  and  exper  ~e,_,.e  :,ho·::."  :,'--:."" t  n 
cannot  leave it to  a  politically unqualifiec  co~~~s~~oL ta  J~­
termine  the French  standard  of  living as  well  as  the  ·'c;:x::··::-
our agriculture and  industry.  We  do  not  intend  of  ~0~r~  t~ 
vent  the  ~onstruction of  Europe;  indeed,  I  bel::..•c:'J·2  tho.t  :-'~·.
0:.:--~  ·"' 
has  been  Ul'gLng·  it forward  more  than  any  other  ·cYct:-.t::·:'  ,  1: 1_  L 
Europe  can  only  be  built by  the resolute  ··o-operJ..tio:r"  c·~·  th~::: 
countries  vlhi,·:h  make  it up.  This  is  OUl'  posi-c~m~  :cr~- ·.-:c:;  ;,h;.'cll 
keep  to  it. 
11  (Lc:;  ]'!]oncle,  29 July  191~5) 
4.  The  :2:uropean  crisis and 
11The  Times" 
Under  the title "France's  moment  of  truth:  too  late for 
bluff  now  in EEC'',  the  European  economic  correspondent  of  The 
Times  commented  as  follows: 
''  For  the  other  member  states,  above  all for  the  spirit 
of  collective  co-operation in Europe,  the refusal  to  ~ive in at 
the  meeting  must  be  accountec~  a  victory.  Up  to  no,,;  it has  always 
gone  the  other way:  French  diplomar>y  backed  by  the brilliance of 
French  officials has  0arried all befqre it. The  outstanding  in-
stance was,  of  course,  the veto  of  the British negotiations  for 
entry  to  the  Common  Market. 
The  French record has  been  one  of  more  or  less  continuous 
success,  granted  that  the  treaty of  ~orne  in the  ~irst place  is 
very  much  in France's  favour.  But  the  other  five,  too  often for 
their  own  good,  have  gone  more  than  halfway  to  senure  agreement 
and  failed  to  assert  their  own  strength. 
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This  wa~,  not  heal  thy  for  Europe.  An(!  it Ins  now  r:hang:eci. 
The  five  were  not  united  on  thh;  or:casion;  but  the  ::1ajori ty  oppo-
sition held  firm.  One  should  not  expect  9  new  balar: r:e  of  power  to 
suddenly assert itself;  indeed,  outwardly,  things  ~ay remain  much 
the  same.  But  even  if the  present  argument  were  settled,  so  that, 
after all,  Fran~e achieved all that  she  was  asking,  the  inner 
r::atalyst  has  occurred.  The  five  have  learnt  that  they  can  stand 
up  for  themselves  and  that France  is not,  as  it  ~30  often  seemed, 
unshakable  in that  curious  realm  of  technocracy  and  politics 
wh::.r>h  constitutes  Common  Market  diplomacy.
11 
One  reason  is  paramount  in explaining why  France  has 
suffered what  appears  to  be  a  setback,  however  vocally her rights 
~ay be  defended  by  her  spokesmen.  It is  that  the  threat  of  break-
ing  up  or  stalling  the  Common  J'vlarket  no  lonryer  holds  good.  This 
fear  that  ~~eneral  de  Gaulle  might  pull  the  how,;e  down,  has  been 
the  n:o:::.'t  powerful  single  factor  making  for  agreement. 
It relnl'or,·ed with  the glint  of  danger  the  genuine  feelings 
towa~d2 integration.  It brought  results  up until the  famous 
r::e~~t_Lll["  3.t  the  end  oi'  last year  •  when  C'Ommon  prir::es  for  cereals 
1·re;re  ·"-.':r~?ed.  It 1;,'as  then  that it became  evident  that  the  Common 
11·kot  TJEuc,  inc! eecl  established.  There  is  no  turning  back. 
'_'rue •  the  Community  r·ould  conceivably  be  wre~'k8d  even  now. 
but  thi::::  bllJ  ~'f  cannot  be  run again.  It woul6  h3.V8  to  be  acted 
out.  And  t!,i;::  is hardly  a  ,~ourse  to  r·ormnend  ~L tself  on  the  eve  of 
an  election  in Frar. ·e,  w!ien  both  industry  and  farmer:::_;  see  ahead 
of  them  the  bene:f~  ts  of  '~u  opean  integra  tior1, 
In other  vvo:>.··cls,  the  1  •  om:r:on  !•!arket  has  e:enme:~!1ed  its members, 
just  as  the  founain~  ~athers have  always  believe~ it would.  ~h~ 
prosress  of  integ-ration,  ·)ll'e it gets  properly  unir::r  way,  carries 
its  oHn  momentum.  r'uttin:cr  t.·~riffs  implies  the  rv;"'cl  :!'or  removcne:: 
other  trade  rest:c·i ction:::,;  t·-:::..::::  in  turn  mean:::::  that  rr~ov ewen  t  of 
capital and  freedom  of  e  .rlo;,rnli:nt  must  be  en::::,.urec.;  l1e1we  the  .c1eed 
to  develop  ~'Omplemeut.':U'y  .-".o··i.:-,_1  ~-tncJ  er::onor11ir~  poli,··if':':-.  Lll1t:'..l, 
finally,  as  i~.  happenin,:  LOH •  poli  t i c8l  r·.:; -opr?ra  L  .. GE  t.>:'~ome~.  a 
matter  of  l.r::-·gency.  Fraru:e,  vrhether  she  like~-~  it  •Jl'  l~ot,  is  in-
extrir:~::tbly  involved  in  tlci.s  pro  ·~r:::ss,  anu  of  ··ou1··~c:- Fren:•hmen  hs.ve 
made  OLitstanliing  eontr~butions  tc"  .. vard:::.  ib:.  :·r.:lfil:h·YJt:.  Ehe  "annat 
opt  c.ut  wi tl1out  rL,inc  he~··~J:lf  r;;oce  hcn·rn  L.haL  ~ro::1cl. 
}'ranee  ~e~:l:J~  ncJ1d  far•r:;d  with  an  J.Wl·::v.~arr~  Clilr~r:;· 1 a.  ·;eneral  cle 
i'}aulle,  ULd8r  tl1f·,  prr.:text  that  a  cOJ.imitrnr:;nt  to  ccrc:ttle  ae:r:'..r·ultu~al 
polic~r has  ~~·rcen  t: ol\:r:;n,  <·nulcl  play up  th'::  c:  i  :;a.vrc(:mr·nt  anci  tr,::·er:.-General  problems 
ten the  Community's  future.  The  danger  of  this  kind  of escalation 
is knowing  when  to  stop:  for  the  sound  and  the  fury  may  no  longer 
completely  convince France's  partners. 
Alternatively,  the French  could  play  down  last night's 
failure,  and  accept  the  view  of  the majority that it is ~ot so 
serious after all,  and  that  time will find  a  way.  But  either 
solution risks  losing  face."  (The  Times,  2.7.1965) 
In the  editorial  column  of  the  same  issue,  The  Tirr.es  w~ote: 
"The  crisis  .••••  must  be  seen for  what  it is:  yet  another 
upheaval  in the  continuous  effort  to  create  a  new  political en-
tity in the heart of Europe.  As  virtually every  issue  frorr.  now 
on will involve  some  loss  of  sovereignty  (reaching ·a  climax when 
majority voting is  introduced in 1966),  the  crises are bound  to 
get bigger  and noisier.  Each  crisis may  be  the  last,  leading  to 
the  breakup  of  the  whole  experiment.  Yet  on  past  experience,  each 
squabble  seems  to  enmesh  each  country  more  closely with its 
partners.  At  some  stage  the Six will reach  a  point where  it will 
seem  impossible  to  go  back.  As  our  European  economic  correspond~~t 
writes  from Brussels,  this  point  may  now  have  been reached.  Only 
France  can  give us  the answer. 
Britain is vitally interested in the  outcome.  A slowing  down 
in the  process  of  integration or  stagnation in Brussels would 
place  a  restraining hand  not  only  on  European  economic  and  poli-
tical developments,  but  on wider questions,  such  as  the Kennedy 
tariff negotiations,  on which  hopes  for  freer world  trade still 
depend.  Yet  if this  crisis is overcome,  like all the others,  it 
will become all the  harder  for Britain to  expect  special treat-
ment  whenever  the  time  comes  for  negotiations  to  be  resumed.  It 
is this  tough,  hardening  process  that·Britain is missing at  a 
crucial time.  The  soothing  (and  encouraging)  words  of  the Foreign 
Secretary in Luxembourg  about  the  need  for  a  unified Europe  and 
about  the necessity for  bridge-building  can  be  no  substitute for 
the hard political battles that  the  integration process  plainly 
implies.  Unity will not  come  without strife." 
In the  leader of 7  July,  The  Times  assesses  the  consequences 
of  a  continued blocking  of  the  Community.  The  Common  Market,  ac-
cording  to  the  paper,  cannot  be  put  in cold  storage.  Stagnation 
meant  decline  or  a  change  into something  else: 
"Superficially this  prospect  has  many  attractions  for Britai":l. 
It is already  obvious  that  economically  and  geographically  the 
Six  form  a  small,  awkward,  and  illogical unit.  Political consider-
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ations  prevent its growing  to  include  the neutral  countries  of 
western  Europe  and  the whole  of  eastern Europe.  From  this  point 
of view it looks  like an  ephemeral  product  of  the  cold war. 
Therefore,  so  the  argument  runs,  cut  out  its political content 
a~d work  for  a  giant  free-trade area in which Britain,  Scandina-
via,  Switzerland,  Austria,  and  eventually,  perhaps,  some  coun-
tries of  eastern Europe  could  take  their natural places.  The 
political dividends  would  be  great. 
There  is  much  to  commend  this argument,  but it ignores  many 
difficulties. It ignores  the  damage  that  could  be  done  by  a  long 
period of uncertainty.  So  long  as  it lasted neither Britain nor 
any  other  country  could  come  to  any  arrangements with  the Six. 
The  Kennedy  round  and  the  proposed bridge-building negotiations 
with  EFTA  would be  bound  to suffer.  Great  hopes  have  been built 
on  both,  and  both hold  out  the  prospects  of  freer  trade  on which 
Britain depends.  The uncertainty  could also  increase  the  dangers 
of  a  world recession.  Over  a  longer  period,  without  the  Common 
Market  as  an  ideal and  a  driving  force,  there  might well  be  in-
sufficient  impetus  to  get  anywhere  very  far. 
In the  short  run neither Britain nor  anyone  else has  any-
thing  to gain  from  a  breakdown.  In the  long  run  the  prospect  is 
not  so  dismaying,  for  new  perspectives  might  open  up,  but  the 
balance  of  advantage still lies  in  the  other direction.  The 
health of  the  Common  Market  is  to  a  large  extent  the  health of 
Europe,  and until it has  sorted  out  its  own  difficulties it is 
unlikely to  evolve  proper relations with Britain or  any  other  of 
its neighbours." 
In  con~lusion,  The  Times  published  an  open letter to its 
Editor under  the  title "The unity of Europe,  where Britain's 
future  lies": 
"Sir,  - As  one  who  took  some  part  in launching  the  campaign 
for  European unity  in the years after the war,  both here  and  on 
the Continent,  and  as  the  first  chairman  of  the  European  Movement, 
I  feel  I  cannot  remain  silent at this  critical juncture  in 
Europe's history. 
The  European  Economic  Community  is  facing  a  grave  crisis, 
which if not  resolved  could  endanger its very  existence. 
It would not  be  appropriate  for  us  here  to  comment  upon  the 
issues  in dispute.  It is  for  the  Six  to  settle their differences 
among  themselves.  But Britain is an  integral part  of Europe  and 
is therefore vitally affected.  We  have,  in consequence,  a  right 
and  a  duty  to  state our  own  position. 
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Let  us  first  make  it  ~lear that,  though  we  are  at  present 
excluded  from  the  Common  I·larket,  we  wish ·it well  and are  deeply 
concerned  about  any  threat  to  its onward  progress.  Let  us,  at 
this  moment  of crisis reaffirm our  faith  in the  concept  of  a 
United Europe  and  reassure  our  continental  friends  that  current 
disagreements  and  disappointments  have  not  in any  way  shaken  our 
conviction that Britain's future  lies in partnership with  them. 
Let us,  moreover,  explain  plainly what  we  mean  by  that.  Let 
us  stop talking vaguely  about  building bridges  between  EFTA  and 
the  EEC.  Instead let us  show  that  we  recognize  that  the  European 
Economic  Community  is,  in practice,  the  only  possible  found~tion 
upon which  the unity of Europe  can  be built. Let  us  a8cordingly 
announce,  without  too  many  "ifs"  and  "buts'',  that,  when  the  way 
is  open,  we  shall be  ready  to  accede  to  the Treaty  of  Rome,  in 
the  confidence  that we  shall be  able  to  safeguard  our  legitimate 
interests better  from within  than we  can  from  outside. 
Finally,  let us  dispel  any  doubts  there  may  be  about  our 
ultimate  intentions,  by  declaring  our will to work  not  only  for 
economic  integration but  also  for  the  progressive  political union 
of J\urope. 
I  believe that this  positive attitude  towards  Europe  is  now 
shared by  the  great  majority  of  thinking  people  in all parties 
in Britain.  But it is not  enough  to  think  these  things.  We  must 
proclaim  them  loudly  and  without  equivocation.  Now,  in  the  hour 
of  Europe's  trial,  is the  time  for  Britain to  speak. 
Yours  fa::. t11fully, 
House  of  Commons,  July  lu." 
(The  Times,  17.7.1965) 
5.  Dutch Socialist opinion  on  the  EEC  crisis 
The  Labour  Party Executive  has  passed  a  resolution on  the 
ending  put  by  the French Government  to  the Council's  discussions; 
it calls  on  the  other  EEC  socialist parties  to  bring their in-
fluence  to  bear  on  their respective  governments  in the  same  way 
as  in preceding months. 
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The  resolution reads  as  follows: 
11The  Party Executive was  seriously  concerned at  the  abrupt 
ending  put  to  the  EEC  talks.by the French  Government,  followed  by 
the French  announcement  that  they would  boycott  subsequent  meet-
ings  of  the  EEC  Council.  The  agricultural  problem  is not  the  only 
point at issue.  Now  that  the  completion  of  the  Common  Market  is 
in sight,  to  ac8ept  without  demur  the French refusal to  come  to 
a  decision  on widening  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament 
would  in fact  mean  accepting weakened  democracy  in Europe  and 
indeed  in our  own  country.  To  accept  the French viewpoint  on 
European  co-operation would  mean  condemning  the  European  Commis-
sion  to  a  state of  impotence  and  casting aside  the  idea  of  any 
genuine  European  integration. 
The  EEC  is thus  faced with its most  serious  crisis yet.  The 
dangers  threatening it can  only be  averted if the  Governments  of 
the  other  EEC  States are  of  one  mind  in rejecting the gaullist 
theories  and  if the  European  Commission  holds  fast  to  the  ground-
planks  and  aims  of  its proposals.
11  (Nieuwe  Rotterdamse  Courant, 
17  July  1965) 
6.  The  Council  of  EuroDean  Local Authorities  calls for  a 
resumption  of  negotiations  on agriculture 
The  Council  of  European Local Authorities  has  sent  the  fol-
lowing  nappeal
11  to  mayors,  municipal  councillors  and  general 
councillors: 
11We  must  speak  plainly  - the  existence  of  the  Common 
Market  is  threatened.  Who  is responsible  for  this  crisis? 
France's  five  partners,  by  hesitating and  often concealing 
their real  aims,  have  undoubtedly  made  some  mistakes;  as  for  the 
French Government,  which  could  have  resorted  to  the Court  of 
Justice  or  to  the arbitration procedure  provided  for  in the  Rome 
Treaty,  it preferred to  block  the  institutions  of  the  Common 
Market. 
If this crisis were  to  go  on,  it would  have  disastrous  con-
sequences  for  all. It would  inevitably arrest  economic  expansion, 
restore  customs  barriers,  worsen  the  farmer's  lot,  upset  pro-
duction  programmes,  lead  to  recession ana  unemployment  and,  fi-
nally,  to  a  marked  lowering  in the  standard  of  living of  the 
whole  population. 
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The  crisis would  thus  seriously affect  the  life of all local 
and  regional  communities. 
In political terms,  this would  mean  the  end  of  the .great 
hope  to  achieve  a  united Europe,  awakened  some  fifteen years  ago 
by  the historical initiative of Robert  Schuman. 
We  would again witness  the upsurge  of  European nationalism, 
which  has  led  to  two  world wars in less 1;;nan  a  quarter of  a  century. 
The  countries that  emerged  from  these  conflicts have  been  so 
weakened  that  far  from  being  in a  position to  assert their in-
dependence,  they  have  in fact  lost  any real  influence  in world 
politics. 
Only  the union  of  the  peoples  of Europe  which  is  today  so 
seriously  jeopardized,  could again  enable  them  to  play their part 
and  protect  their safety and welfare. 
We  are still in time  to  prevent  an  irretrievable mistake. 
Negotiations  must  be  resumed  as  soon as  possible  on  the  basis  of 
the  proposals  made  by  the  Europ~an Commission.  Any  Government 
that would  refuse  to  do  this wQuld  bear  the  grave  responsibility 
for  the  consequences. 
Abiding  by  the spirit and  the will of  the States General  of 
European Local Authorities,  we  urge  the representatives  of re-
gional  and  local authorities  to  warn  the  populations  for  which 
they are respons.ible  and  to  appeal  to  public  opinion  in our 
countries  in order to  saf~guard the  chance  of  achieving  a  united 
Europe  which  is the  only  true  guarantee  of  peace,  freedom,  in-
dependence  and  prosperity."  (Le  fv1onde,  6  August  1965) 
7.  The French Communist  Party and  the  Common  Market 
In a  press  release  on  the Common  Market  crisis,  the  Political 
Bureau  of  the French  Communist  Party stated in particular:  "The 
Common  Market  has  added  to  the  divergence of  opinions  in the  six 
countries  concerned.  Competition has  therefore  increased for  the 
benefit  of  the  strongest  and  best  equipped  monopolies,  chiefly 
those  of  the Federal Republic  of  Germany,  whose  political and, 
above  all,  atomic  claims  have  grown  stronger. 
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However,  deeper  involvement  in political integration is  now 
being advocated;  this  implies  the  relinquish~ent of national in-
dependence  on behalf of  supranational bodies  that  are  beyond  the 
control  of  the  people.  It would  mean  surrenderin~ our  country  to 
the  hegemony  of  large European  monopolies,  German  military and 
"revanchiste"  factions  and American  imperialists. 
The  Political Bureau  of  the French  Communist  Party recalls 
that the  true solution,  that would  safeguard both  the  interest of 
our  country  and its independence,  lies  in  the  unhampered  develop-
ment  of trade  and  economic  co-operation between France  and all 
countries,  regardless  of their regime,  and  in particular between 
all capitalist and  socialist countries  of Europe.  It should be 
stressed,  moreover,  that while  trade between France  and  her 
Common  Market  partners has  increased  during  the  past  few  years, 
it still only represents  about  one  third of France's total  foreign 
trade.  This  proves,  if anything,  that  there  is no  reason at all 
for  our  country  to agree  to being  enclosed within the  narrow 
bounds  of  the  Common  Market."  (Le  Monde,  31 July 1965) 
8.  Mr.  Willy Brandt  advocates  the  creation of  a  European 
secretariat 
At  the  invitation of  the Italian Social Democrats, 
Mr.  Willy Brandt,  Chairman  of  the  SPD  and  Mayor  of West  Berlin, 
spoke  at  the Capitol in Rome  on  "Democratic  socialism and  Europe". 
He  called for  a  new  approach  in Europe  and  advocated  a  gra-
dualist  policy  towards  unification.  He said  that  the  time  for 
political integration was  not  ripe;  this was  however  no  reason 
for  giving up;  all the possibilities had  to  be  explored  to round 
off  the  existing European Community  and  make  it more  democratic. 
In this  connexion Mr.  Brandt  discussed  a  proposal  to  set up 
a  European secretariat as  a  standing advisory  and  information 
body;  this  proposal was  put  forward  last year by Mr.  Saragat,  the 
then Italian Foreign Secretary. It was  a  question of  planning and 
political co-ordination.  The  European  secretariat would  have  to 
have  a  standing planning  committee.  This  would  not  be  an  authority 
but would  comprise  experts  from  each  country.  They  would  have  to 
be  independent  of  their Governments  i.e.  not  "under  ordersn. 
Mr.  Brandt  described  the  duties  of  the  European  secretariat 
as  follows: 
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It would  act as  a  go-between between Governments,  providing 
information and  advice,  and  Governments  could  entrust it with  the 
task of  examining  specific  issues  and  preparing deliberations. 
It should also  be  able  to  put  forward  proposals  and  make  recom-
mendations.  Further requirements  for  promoting  European »nifica-
tion were: 
l.  A  serious  examination of  the French  proposal  to  co-ordinate 
scientific and  technical research in  the  six EEC  States. 
2.  Closer  economic  co-operation between  the  EEC  and  EFTA. 
3.  More  effective democratic  control  over  the  existing European 
institutions. 
4.  The  promotion of  economic,  personal  and  technical relations 
between West  and  East Europe.  "The  time  has  come  to  follow 
through  the political implications  of  the  truism that  Europe 
does  not  end at the Iron Curtain,"  he  said. 
Mr.  Brandt was  strongly opposed  to  introducing  ideologies 
into European  policy.  Over-enthusiastic  observers  had  read 
Carolingian or Christian Democrat  overtones  into western  co-opera-
tion.  Of  late,  on  the  other  hand,  it had  been asked whether  the 
development  of  Europe  was  moving  towards  Social Democracy. 
Hr.  Brandt  said that he  was  a  Social Democrat  but  that he  was 
opposed  to  any  policy that  erred on  the  side  of narrow-mindedness. 
On  Atlantic relations he  said there were  spheres  in which 
Europe  could  take  the initiative without waiting  for  the  support 
of  the  USA.  There were,  however,  other  problems  that  could  only 
be  solved with  the  co-operation and  assistance of  the  USA.  For 
the security of  free  Europe  for  example,  the  physical  presence  of 
American  soldiers was  very  important.  Interdependence was  no  mere 
wish,  it was  a  fact  and  a  necessity;  Mr.  Brandt  said that  this 
had  been brought  home  to  him  in his  experience as  Mayor  of West 
Berlin.  (Die Welt,  29.6.1965;  Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  30.6.1965) 
9.  Statement  by Senator Battaglia, Vice-President  of  the 
European  Parliament,  on  the  problems  of  the  Community 
On  5  August,  Senator Edoardo Battaglia, Vice-President  of 
the European  Parliament,  was  interviewed by  the  "Europa Unita" 
Agency  on  the  situation and  prospects  of  the  European Communities. 
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Discussing  future  development  in the Communities,  Senator 
Battaglia stated that he  was  convinced  that  the  EEC  Commission, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Governments  concerned  on  the  other, 
which were all striving hard  to build up  Europe  - albeit through 
different approaches  and  with different  aims  - would  eventually 
find  a  common  ground  for  preventing any  serious  impairment  of 
economic  integration. 
Replying  to  a  question  on  the  need  to  foster  the revival  of 
the  European  ideal through  the  European  Parliament,  Senator 
Battaglia stressed the necessity for wider  dissemination of  the 
European  ideal and  the fact  that  the  European Parliament  was  en-
deavouring,  through its Monthly Bulletins and  other  publications, 
and  by  financing  of  study missions,  to  reach this  aim.  The  Euro-
pean Parliament was  convinced that Europe  could not  become  a 
reality unless  nthe  ideal of  a  united Europe  has  penetrated  the 
minds  and  the  hearts  of  the  peoples  of  the  six countriesn.  The 
Parliament was  also  convinced  that  elections  by direct universal 
suffrage would not  only  enhance  the authority of  Parliament it-
self,  which  would  become  the  direct  expression of  the  people's 
will,  but  also  provide  the  possibility for  that wider  dissemina-
tion of  information which  is necessary  to build up  the will of 
the  people.  nrn  other words,n  Senator Battaglia concluded, 
"elections by direct universal suffrage would  be  informative as 
well  as  formative.n  (nEuropa Unitan  Agency,  5  August  1965) 
10.  Professor Hallstein's statement  on  the  EEC  crisis at the 
CDU/CSU  Economic  Congress  in Dusseldorf 
At  the  CDU  Economic  Congress  (8/9 July 1965),  Mr.  Schmucker, 
Minister  for  Economic  Affairs,  called upon  the  German  public  not 
to  lose heart  over  the  present  difficulties  in  the  EEC  for  the 
European Economic  Community  was  a  political and  economic  necessi-
ty.  nAt  present we  can  only  hope  that what  Europe  has  achieved 
economically is so  irreversible as  to  make  it impossible  politia-
ally to  brush  these  achievements  aside  - whether  this  be  to  th~ 
liking of  politicians or not.n  Despite  the bitter experiences  of 
recent  weeks  the  EEC  had,  by  1970,  to  create  a  real internal 
market.  Dr.  Adenauer,  the  former  Federal Chancellor,  described 
the  crisis  "as  an internal matter  for  the  EEC  and  its institu-
tions"  and  he  expressed  the  hope  that  things  would  soon  return 
to  normal. 
Professor Hallstein,  President  of  the  EEC  Commission,  gave  a 
strongly worded warning  against  any  dramatization of  the  EEC 
crisis and  advocated utmost  reserve. 
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Professor Hallstein went  on  to  say  "the  interim regulations 
on  financing  the agricultural  policy  expired  on 30  June.  With 
this  in mind,  the Council  of Ministers  called upon  the  Commission 
- in its resolution of  15th December  1965  - to  make  proposals: 
1.  on  financing  the  common  agricultural policy for  the  period 
1965-1970.  The  Commission  submitted  proposals  in good  time; 
2.  on  the  pooling  of agricultural levies  and  other Community  re-
venues.  The  Commission also  submitted  proposals  to  this effect; 
3.  These  two  sets  of  proposals  (on  financing  the  agricultural 
policy and  independent  revenues  for  the  Community)  complied 
with  the  terms  of  the  previous  finanrial regulation by which 
the Council required  the Commission  to  make  proposals  for  the 
final  stage  of  the  Common  Market,  in particular as  to when  and 
under what  conditions  that  stage  should begin.  This  we  have 
done. 
4.  Fourthly,  we  submitted  a  proposal  to  enhance  the  part  played 
by  the  European  Parliament  in connexion with  budgetary ques-
tions.  The  Council  did not  explicitly ask  us  to  do  this but it 
did  so  implicitly.  Article  2  of  the  previous  financial regula-
tion lays  down  that  the  provisions  on  the  independent  revenues 
of  the Community  have  to be ratified by  the  Parliaments  of  the 
Member  States.  There  are,  of  course,  Parliaments  where  there 
are strong currents  in  favour  of making  this ratification sub-
ject to  the r8le of  the European  Parliament  being reinforced. 
We  have  to bear  these things  in mind  if we  wish  to  avoid  the 
risk of making  proposals  that are  of  academic  interest  only. 
I  quote  from  a  Council  statement  of  23  December  1963:  nThe 
Council  .•••  emphasized,  in its discussions  on  the  operation 
of  the  European  Guidance  and  Guarantee Fund,  that it attached 
great  importance  to  the question of strengthening  the  budgetary 
powers  of  the  Parliament." 
Our  proposals  in this  connexion are,  furthermore,  very  mode-
rate.  Particular attention has  been  paid  to  the  principle that  the 
Council  of Ministers  and  not  the  Parliament  is the budgetary autho-
rity.  The  European  Parliament,  which  furthermore  supported  our 
proposals  by  an overwhelming majority,  made  demands  in a  much-
quoted  resolution that were  decidedly  further-reaching;  individual 
members  and  Parliaments  subsequently did  so  too. 
It has  on  occasion been alleged  (although not  in Germany) 
that the  Commission  has  complicated  the  issue  through  the arbi-
trary  addi~ion of political conditions.  This  brief outline of  the 
facts  should  refute these allegations.  We  added  nothing;  we  simply 
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answered  the  questions arlslng from  the  texts  and  we  did  so  in 
full.  The  r6le of  scapegoat  for  which we  have  been  cast is  one 
which  we  must  therefore repudiate quite  categorically. 
The  Council  of Ministers  discussed  the Commission  proposals 
for  five  days.  This  led  to  real  progress.  For  example,  there was 
an  agreement  in principle that  the  transitional stage  of  the 
Common  Market  should  end  on  l  July 1967,  and  there was  an  agree-
ment  on  the  procedure relating  to  a  whole  series of  important 
conditions  for  the agricultural market;  talks  on  the  conditions 
for  the  industrial market  were  well under  way.  There  was  an agree-
ment  in principle  that  customs  duties  should as  the  Community 
developed  be  paid  into  the  Community  treasury.  Discussions  on 
certain points  of detail had  begun.  On  the  important  question of 
financing  the  agricultural policy,  a  rapprochement  had  been 
achieved,  which  was  mainly  due  to  the  conciliatory attitude of 
the French  members  of  the Council.  Unfortunately talks  had  barely 
begun  on  the question of  the  budgetary  powers  of  the  Parliament. 
(See  the  internal  52  page  report  of  the  Commission which  devotes 
only  two-and-a-half  pages  to  this  part  of  the  Council  session.) 
In view  of  this  situation the Commission  made  a  determined 
effort at  the  last session to  further  the Council  discussion. 
Obviously,  in organizing the  discussions,  the  time  factor  was 
under-estimated.  It is not  a  matter  to  be  treated lightly when 
a  timetable  laid down  in a  Community  regulation  - by which  a  major 
decision has  to  be  taken  - is not  adhered  to.  Yet  there  is  no 
lack of  precedent  here  for  continuing  discussions  in  such  cases. 
When,  for  example,  the  deadline  from  the first  to  the  second 
stage  of  the  transition period of  our  Community  occurred  on 
l  January  1962  - a  Treaty deadline  - it had  proved  impossible  to 
reach  agreement  on  certain of  the  conditions  of  our French  friends; 
at their suggestion the  clock was  stopped  and  fourteen  days  later 
agreement  was  reached.  Unfortunately  on  this  occasion  the Council 
was  unable  to agree  on  adopting  a  similar  procedure  although 
there was  strong  support  for  our  suggestion. 
In assessing  the  present  situation any  attempt  to  dramatize 
should be  avoided  and  the greatest  restramt  exercised  about  spe-
culations as  to  the  future.  Only  one  statement  is  possible  and  I 
believe that I  must  make  it:  no  one  intends  to  challenge  the  idea 
of  the  Common  Market.  To  do  so  would  be  the  greatest act  of 
destruction in the history of  Europe,  indeed  in  the  free world, 
since  the  days  of Hitler;  nothing,  I  repeat,  nothing  gives  us  the 
right  to  countenance  such  designs. 
However,  the  situation remains  serious  enough.  The  enactment 
of  a  regulation for  the  future  financing  of  the  common  agricultu-
ral policy is  the  bounden,  inescapable  duty  of  the Council  and 
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this is a  matter  of real  moment.  The  failure  to  adhere  to  the 
timetable is most  unfortunate,  but  the  damage  done  is not  irre-
parable.  The  course  of  the  discussions  so  far  does  not  preclude 
the  possibility of  agreement.  On  the  contrary~  Of  course,  there 
is never  any  absolute  certainty of  success  in negotiations be-
tween  six partners where  the  disagreement  of  one  can suffice to 
prevent  agreement.  The  only  reasonable question we  can ask our-
selves  is whether  there is any real  chance  of  success.  The  answer 
to  this  is  "yes",  and it is  the  answer  that  most  of  those  taking 
part  gave.  They  not  only said they wanted  to fulfil  the  common 
obligation,  but  they  took appropriate action and,  as  I  said,  this 
attitude has  already begun  to  produce  results. 
Every effort must  therefore be  concentrated  on  the  resump-
tion of negotiations.  The  cure  to  the  crisis must  start at the 
point  were  negotiations were  broken off.  The  efforts  of  the  Com-
mission are  directed  towards  this  end. 
For  the  moment  this  is all that  I  can  say  here  in  public  if 
I  am  not  myself  to  jeopardize the  success  of  these  efforts." 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  9.7.1965;  10.7.1965;  Neue 
ZUrcher  Zeitung,  9.7.1965) 
ll.  Discussion of European questions  between Mr.  Saragat  and 
Dr.  Erhard 
On  6  July 1965  Mr.  Saragat,  the Italian President,  accom-
panied by  Mr.  Fanfani,  the Italian Foreign Minister,  came  to 
Germany  on  a  four-day  state visit.  The Brussels  crisis  and  de-
velopments  in Europe  were  the  focal  point  of  the  political dis-
cussions.  Both  sides recalled that  closer political co-operation 
between  the  partners  of  the  Common  Market  was  absolutely essen-
tial. 
In Bonn it was  emphasized  that it was  Italy that  had  taken 
the  initiative regarding  the  summit  conference  in Venice  whi~h 
had  failed  to materialize because  of  the  opposition of  Gener~l de 
Gaulle.  Attention was  drawn  to  the  cordial relations  existing be-
tween  the Federal Republic  and Italy. It was  also  emphasized  that 
the  two  countries  - both  importers  of agricultural  products  -
were  equally interested in and  concerned  about  agricultural 
questions. 
At  a  reception at Schloss BrUhl,  Dr.  LUbke,  the Federal 
President,  recalled Cavour's  remark  to Bismarck  that Prussia and 
Piedmont  shared the  same  interests and  difficulties,  and  added 
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that this was  true  of Italy and  Germany  today.  He  also alluded to 
Dante  who  had  launched  the great  theme  of  European  peace  and  had 
been  one  of  the  first  champions  of  European unity.  Dr.  Lubke 
thanked  the Italian Government  for  its staunch  support  of 
Germany's  vital interests,  particularly on  the  reunification 
issue. 
President Saragat  conveyed  a  warm-hearted  message  of  friend-
ship  from  his  people.  He  expressed admiration for  the  achievements 
of  German  technology  and  industry,  and  the  hope  that  the  inter-
national situation would  develop along  peaceful  lines  that would 
help  the  Germans  to achieve national unity.  The Italian President 
said:  "What  we  want  above  all is a  Europe  no  longer  confined by 
outdated  clannish interests but  open  to all European  countries 
that are  ready to accept its ideas  and  to  make  the necessary 
sacrifices,  a  Europe  that will  transform the alliance with  the 
United States  into  a  vast  community  of  free nations." 
At  the  talks  between President Saragat  and  Chancellor Erhard 
at  the  Palais  Schaumburg it was  stressed that  the  EEC  must  be 
preserved at all costs.  Dr.  Erhard  dwelt  on  the wide  measure  of 
agreement  that had  been reached  in the  talks.  Europe  - he  said  -
needed  a  new  impetus  and 
11If today we  are working  closely together 
in  the  European  Economic  Community,  if we  wish  to  save it, it is 
also  because  we  look ahead  to another Europe,  broader-based and 
peaceably united  in a  close Atlantic  partnership".  The  work  that 
had  already been  embarked  upon under  the Rome  Treaties  and  that 
had  since  passed  into history,  had  to  be  brought  to  completion. 
During  the  talks,  President  Saragat,  too,  dwelt  on  the  close 
connexion that  existed between European  integration and  Atlantic 
partnership.  (Bulletin of  the  Press  and Information Service  of 
the Federal Government,  Nos.  116  and  117,  8  and  9 July 1965; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  6  and  7  July 1965) 
12.  Resolution of  the European Union  of Federalists  of  Luxembourg 
On  28  June  1965,  the General  Assembly  of  the  European Union 
of Federalists  of Luxembourg  passed  a  resolution to  the  effect 
that,  in view  of  the  threat  and  the  problems with which  Europe 
was  faced  in 1965,  the  political unification in a  federal  form  of 
European  countries  enjoying  similar  systems  of  democratic  freedom 
and united by  the  same  civilization,  remained  an unescapable  ne-
cessity.  No  policy;  whether  foreign  or  military,  whose  aim  was  to 
safeguard  the  interests  of  the  countries  of  Europe,  was  conceiva-
ble  outside  the  European  context.  It was  consequently  the  duty  of 
the  Governments,  in particular those  of  the  six countries  of  the 
Community,  to  seek  a  way  towards  real political unification that 
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would  lead  to  the  early setting up  of  a  federal  government  and 
parliament.  Mere  links  of  co-operation between States  could not 
prevent  the  division of  the  countries  of Europe  and,  therefore, 
their dependence  on  outside  countries.  In order  to  defend effi-
ciently its interests  and  to  play  a  peaceful part in the  world, 
Europe  had  to  be  in  a  position to  speak with  one  voice. 
The  European  Union  of Federalists denounced  the  revival  of 
dangerous  myths  of grandeur  and  national  independence  that were 
coming  to  the  front  in  certain countries.  It invited Governments, 
Parliaments  and political parties  to proceed  to  the  next  stage 
in  the  construction of  a  political Europe  by  strengthening  the 
powers  of  the  European  Parliament  and  electing its members  by 
direct universal  suffrage  in accordance  with Article 138,  para.~ 
of  the  Rome  Treaty. 
The  European  Union  of Federalists was  of the  op1n1on  that 
the  merger  of  the  Executives  of  the  three  European  Communities 
which is now  about  to  be  ratified in  the  six national Parlia-
ments  should  in no  way  entail a  reduction  in  the  powers  of  the 
new  Community  Executive.  It therefore  urged  the  Parliaments  to 
prevent  such  a  danger  by  not ratifying the  merger  treaty unless 
it was  made  clear  that its supranational  character would  be 
maintained  in accordance  with  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
In conclusion,  the  European  Union  of Federalists  called for 
the  full  support  of all Federalists  in order  to bring about  t~e 
necessary democratic  conditions  for  a  true political revival 
that would  overcome  the  powerlessness  of  Governments  in  creating 
the  United  States  of Europe.  (La  Voix  f~d~raliste,  No.  l, 1965) 
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Mr.  Marjolin discusses  economic  trends  in  the  Europe 
of  the  Six 
Mr.  Marjolin,  Vice-President  o~the EEC  Commission,  discussed 
expansion  and  inflation in Europe  in a  speech  to  the Association 
of  Economic  Journalists delivered  in Paris  on  9  July  1965. 
In his  view,  the  two  signs  of  inflation were  (a)  higher 
prices  and  (b)  lower  profits.  Both  these  signs  had  appeared  in 
France  in  the  course  of  the  past  few  years.  Italy,  too,  suffered 
from  inflation and,  since  the  beginning  of this year,  there were 
also  marked  inflationist trends  in Western  Germany.  The  level  of 
German  imports  from  other  EEC  countries  for  the  first quarter  of 
1965  was  40  per  cent higher  than that for  the  first quarter  of 
1964.  Increased  German  demand  for  foreign  products  had  stimulated 
activity in France  and  Italy. 
In  a  country  such as  the  United States,  where  there  was 
still unemployment,  it was  possible  to  have  expansion under  con-
ditions  of stability.  This  could not  obtain in Europe,  where 
productive  forces  were  practically all fully  employed.  The  answer 
to  the  problem lay  in  a  rational  incomes  policy,  and it should  be 
tackled in a  practical manner  "which is not  often  the  case".  It 
was  not  just a  matter of ensuring that employers'  and workers' 
organizations  signed  contracts which  complied with  incomes  policy 
rules  but  rather that employers'  and workers'  unions  should  be  in 
a  position to  enforce  the  terms  of  such  contracts.  It was  doubt-
ful  whether  the  unions  were  in fact  in  a  position to  do  so. 
Mr.  Marjolin felt,  however,  that  these  difficulties  should not 
lead  to  despondency. 
The  days  when  inflation stimulated  investment were  now  over 
and  Mr.  Marjolin regarded monetary  stability  (which  could  put  up 
with an  increase  of  1  to  2  per  cent  per  annum)  as  the  essential 
condition for  any  economic  development.  Fifteen years'  experience 
had  convinced  him  that it was  always  possible  to revive  economic 
activity if one  was  determined  to  do  so. 
Inflation in France  had  in fact  delayed  capital  investment: 
last year  German  firms  invested 50  per  cent  more  than  French 
firms.  (Le  Monde,  11/12  July  1965) 
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1.  Europe  and Atlantic  economic  co-operation 
Writing  in the  journal  of  the  Dutch Industry and  Trade 
Society  ("Nederlandse  Maatschappij  voor Nijverheid  en  Handel"), 
Professor  F.  Hartog  came  to  the  conclusion that  the near future 
did not  seem  too  promising for Atlantic  co-operation. 
Economically  and  politically,  opposition to Atlantic 
co-operation was  stronger  than  support  for it. 
There  was  first  the  fear  of  American  economic  domination: 
closer western European  links with  the  United  States,  would  mean 
increased  competition  from  American  giant  concerns.  These  often 
had  the  advantage  of greater financial  resistance  to  competition, 
world-wide  ramifications,  greater penetration power  through 
their foreign  branches  (in Europe  in this  case)  and,  above  all, 
more  financial  scope  for  research. 
In Professor Hartog's  opinion,  the  fear  that Atlantic 
co-operation would  cause  a  considerable  increase  of American 
investments  in Western  Europe  (1)  was  hardly  justified,  seeing 
that  the  American  share  in the  total capital  invested  in EEC  in-
dustries was  only  2  per  cent,  and  even  l~ per  cent  in France. 
The  benefit of American  investment  in Europe  lay in  the  know-how 
provided  by  the  American  subsidiary  companies.  The  elimination 
of  mutual  trade restrictions  meant  the  removal  of an  incentive 
to  American  investment  in the  EEC.  Moreover,  the  measures  taken 
by  the  American  Government with a  view  to  improving  the  balance 
of  payments,  and  the  shortage  of  manpower  in the  EEC  had  a 
curbing  influence  on  investment.  On  the  whole,  therefore,  it did 
not  seem  likely that Europe  would  be  flooded  with American  capi-
tal as  a  result  of  the  elimination of  customs  barriers. 
The  fact  that  the  EEC  countries  had  an unfavourable  balance 
in regard  to patents  was  essentially due  to  large  American 
spending  on  research.  American  per  capita expenditure  on  re-
search was  about  four  times  higher  than  that in  the  main  European 
countries.  Indeed,  the  United  States was  so  far ahead  that it 
would not  be  possible  for  Europe  to  catch up  on her within  the 
foreseeable  future.  Prof.  Hartog  felt,  therefore,  that  the  only 
alternative at present was  to  import American  licences.  These 
were  not necessarily  more  expensive  than  EEC  patents,  American 
research work  being  often more  remunerative  owing  to  the  more 
intensive use  made  of it. The  American  tax-payer bears  part of 
the  cost  of  research work  carried out  in  some  branches  of  in-
dustry,  e.g.  electronic  and  aeronautical engineering.  Also, 
(l)  These  have  doubled  since the  EEC  was  set up 
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civil industry often benefits  from military research paid  by  the 
Government.  This  was,  in fact,  a  dmtartion  of  competition as 
far as  European  industry was  concerned. 
All  these  factors  had various  effects and  they were  cer-
tainly not all premonitory  signs  of  a  dominating American  in-
fluence  on  European  industry. 
Prof.  Hartog regarded  the  closing of  EEC  markets  resulting 
from  the  common  economic  policy as  one  of  the  obstacles  to 
Atlantic  co-operation.  Where  this  common  policy had  progressed 
most,  i.e.  in agriculture,  it strongly  promoted  the  forming  of 
blocs.  The  common  agricultural policy was  the  result of all 
kinds  of  compromises  reached at the  expense  of  third countries. 
The  EEC  was  automatically driven to  continental protectionism, 
hopelessly  lacking in flexibility when  mutual  concessions  had  to 
be  made  in economic  contacts with third countries.  This  had  been 
apparent at  the  Kennedy  Round  negotiations. 
With regard  to  the  political aspect  of  the  question, 
Prof.  Hartog felt  that General  de  Gaulle's  policy was  driving 
Great Britain into America's  arms.  However,  as  soon as  Great 
Britain was  a  member  of  the  EEC,  she  might well  adopt  the  same 
attitude as  France,  for  her  position in Europe  was  far  more 
important  than  that  in the  much  wider Atlantic  framework. 
In the  long run,  the  fast growth  of population in the  rest 
of  the world  might  incite  the Atlantic  countries  to  form  a 
closer unity  in order  to  compensate  their numerical  inferiority. 
A  military and political threat  could have  been  a  more  immediate 
catalyst,  but actual developments  over  recent years  had  taken  a 
different turn. 
A  joint effort to help  economically underdeveloped  countries 
would  be  a  practical  common  task for  the united Atlantic world. 
However,  up  till now  this had not  proved  a  cohesive  factor.  Out-
standing qualities would  be  required  of  the  statesmen  who  would 
get us  out  of  the  present deadlock.  What  we  needed,  Prof.  Hartog 
concluded,  was  a  Kennedy  in the  United States,  a  Schuman  in 
Western Europe  and  a  Stalin in  the  Soviet  Union.  (Maatschappij-
belangen,  No.  8,  August  1965) 
2.  European unification and  reJations  between  the  EEC  and  EFTA 
The  present division of Western Europe  into  two  separate 
preferential zones,  i.e.  the  EEC  and  EFTA,  could  be  prevented 
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"provided  that the  problem  is  tackled with realism and  also with 
equal  measures  of patience  and  firmness".  This  view  was  expressed 
by  Dr.  Alighiero  de  Micheli,  Representative  for  European  economic 
affairs  and  former  President,  Confederation  of Italian Industry, 
in an article published  in Issue  No.  4  of  EFTA  Bulletin. 
In Dr.  de  Micheli's  oplnlon,  the  most  effective approach  to 
a  policy  aimed at  the  economic  unification of Europe  was  to  give 
added  power  to existing institutions:  "The  path leading  towards 
unification would  become  more  arduous,  if not actually  impassable, 
if any  attempt were  made  to render it easier by  weakening  or di-
viding the  Community.  On  the  contrary,  it can  be  claimed  that  an 
undertaking  of  this  magnitude~ bristling with difficulties  though 
it may  be,  is more  likely to  be  brought  to  a  satisfactory  con-
clusion if the  EEC  is strong and  united;  strong  and  united,  that 
is  to  say,  to  the  point where  it can act as  a  pole  of attraction 
and  at the  same  time  be  able  to  tackle  the  problems  facing it 
without  fear  of  insecurity.
11 
"Similarly,"  Dr.  de  Micheli  went  on  to  say,  "at the  one 
time  when  virtually complete  unification of Western Europe  seemed 
almost within reach  - I  am  referring to  the  negotiations  for 
United  Kingdom  membership  of  the  EEC  - the  Community  was  already 
in existence  and  in operation.  Even  the  existence  of  EFTA,  which 
in its very  different way  represents  the  other nucleus  of Euro-
pean  integration,  is in  some  measure  connected with  the  existence 
of  the  Common  Market." 
Dr.  de  Micheli  felt that  "the  fundamental  requirement  is 
for  both  the  EEC  and  EFTA  to bear  constantly  in mind  the  ultimate 
objective  of unification".  In his  opinion,  unification "will  only 
be  possible within  the  Common  Market  framework".  With  this  end  in 
view,  contacts  should  be  maintained  and  possible  institutiona-
lized.  It was  necessary  "to proceed  in such  a  manner  that  the  two 
economic  areas  may  in the  meantime  develop,  not parallel to  each 
other,  nor  needless  to  say  in opposite  direction,  but  on  con-
vergent  paths  so  that agreement  on  given problems  can  be  made 
possible". 
These  problems  could  be  classed  in  two  basic  categories: 
on  the  one  hand  problems  not  so  much  of harmonization as  of 
minlmlZlng  differences  in certain spheres  of  internal economic 
policy  (e.g.  in taxation,  restrictive practices,  and  agriculture), 
and  on  the  other  hand,  problems  concerning harmonization  of 
national policies regarding  economic  relations with  foreign 
countries.  The  chances  of  making  significant progress  as  regards 
the  first group  of  problems  were  - one  should  be  realistic enough 
to admit  - slim in  the  extreme  if one  considered  the  difficulties 
that have  been  and  are still being  encountered  even within  the 
EEC  itself. 
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With  regard  to  the  second  group  of  problems,  agreement 
would  seem  to  be  possible  even  today:  a  successful  outcome  of 
the  GATT  tariff  negotiations~  by  reducing existing discrimina-
tory  measures~  may  provide  a  fresh starting point  for  full-scale 
talks  on unification. 
These  conditions were  not  in themselves  adequate  but  should 
be  regarded as  necessary preliminaries before  agreement  could  be 
reached.  Such  agreement  could not  come  about  unless  the  EFTA 
countries were willing to  consider European unification not as 
a  problem  that amounts  to little more  than  a  consideration of 
economic  values  and  interests~ but  as  a  more  complex  and  profound 
phenomenon  affecting  the  economic  and political realities  of  the 
entire continent.  (EFTA  Bulletin,  Vol.  VI~  No.  4,  June  1965) 
3.  Statement  by  the  Ministers  of Agriculture  of  the  OECD 
The  Ministers  of Agriculture  of  the  OECD  countries  met  in 
Paris  on  17  and  18  June  1965.  The  discussion was  mainly  on  agri-
cultural adjustments  which  had  become  necessary  as  a  result  of 
current  economic  trends.  These  adjustments,  which  lmplied setting 
up  an  economically  sounder agricultural sector,  based  on  viable 
and  sufficiently large  farming  estates,  were  one  of  the  main 
means  of raising  the  standard  of living of  the  farming  population. 
In addition,  these  adjustments  - as well  as  improved  world  agri-
cultural markets  - should  gradually render  agriculture  less 
dependent  on  support  systems  and  on  protection against external 
competition.  They  would  thus  make  it possible  to  achieve  in  the 
more  developed  countries  an efficient production  in keeping with 
both domestic  demand  and  the  situation and  trends  in  the  rest of 
the world. 
The  Ministers also dealt with  two  reports,  namely  "Agri-
culture and  economic  growth
11  and  "The  interdependence  of agri-
cultural supply  and  income  problems".  These  reports  show  that 
agricultural production  and productivity are still progressing, 
but  that  the  relative part  of  the national  product and  income 
from  the  agricultural sector,  as well  as  the  proportion of 
farming  labour  in regard  to total labour,  were  decreasing.  Agri-
culture  remained,  however,  an  important  sector  in social and 
economic  life: it contributed  to  development  by  supplying  food-
stuffs  in abundance  and at a  reasonable  price.  It also  made 
available  to  other  economic  sectors large  resources  whenever 
these  could  be.used  more  efficiently.  Furthermore,  numerous 
industries,  as well as activities connected  with  the  provision 
of  services  (e.g.  transport and  the  food  industry)  depended  to 
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a  large  extent  or entirely on  the  agricultural sector.  Agricul-
tural exports also represented  in  some  countries  the  most  im-
portant  source  of  foreign  currency. 
The  constant  decrease  in the  number  of agricultural workers 
would  increasingly affect  farm-owners  and  this trend would  hasten 
the  grouping  together  of  farming  estates.  Unless  agric~ltural 
structures were  modified  and  provided  farmers  with larger  and 
more  efficient production units,  the  gap  would  widen  between 
incomes  which  farmers  hoped  to  obtain and  those  they actually 
obtained,  despite  support prices. 
Agricultural policy  should  be  sufficiently flexible  to 
react  to both surplus  and  deficit situations.  By  improving  agri-
cultural structures it should  become  easier  to adjust  supply  to 
either of  these  situations,  for  farms  with a  large  turnover  were 
generally  in  a  better position than small estates  to  determine 
the  volume  and  structure  of  their production  on  a  long-term 
basis.  In addition,  a  continuous  reduction  in the  number  of  low-
income  farms  would  render  the  problem  of  farming  income  less 
critical and  give  the  Governments  more  scope  for  action  in re-
gard  to  supply  by  means  of  the  price policy  or  through  other 
methods. 
When  determining  their domestic agricultural policies, 
countries  should  consider  the  effect of  such policies  on  inter-
national  trade.  Closer  co-operation between  OECD  countries  in 
order  to  reduce  differences  that  may  exist between  the  national 
and  international  a~pects of agricultural policies  should  con-
tribute  to  a  better development  of world  economy  and  prove 
beneficial to all countries,  both individually and  collectively. 
The  Ministers also  acknowledged  the  fact  that  an  improve-
ment  in  the  conditions  under  which  international trade  in agri-
cultural products  was  being  carried out,  would  contribute  to 
strengthening  the  economic  position of  countries  whose  economic 
development  depended  essentially on  the  possibility  CJf  increas-
ing their agricultural exports.  For  developing  Member  States, 
this  problem would  remain  of vital importance until  such  time 
as  other  economic  sectors  could  be  developed at a  faster pace. 
(L
10bservateur  de  l
10ECD,  August  1965) 
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4.  GATT  and  the  Common  Market  crisis 
Under  this title,  the  special  correspondent  of the 
11Moniteur 
Officiel du  Commerce  international,  discussed  the  progress  of  the 
GATT  tariff negotiations.  These  negotiations are  divided  into  two 
main parts:  a)  the  industrial part and  b)  the agricultural part. 
The  latter was  bound  to  suffer most  from  the  present disagree-
ment  between  the  Six. 
"Two  ticklish problems  arise at present  from  the  divergence 
of  opinions  among  the  Six.  The  first problem  is whether  the ne-
gotiating mandate  given  by  the  Council  of Ministers  to  the  Com-
mission will extend  long  enough  to enable  the  EEC  representatives 
in Geneva  to  take  part in the  discussions.  When  the  appointed 
representatives  of  the  Community will have  to  go  to Brussels  for 
further  instructions, will  the  EEC  be  in  a  position to  renew 
their  mandate~ Whilst  no  reply  can  be  given  to this question,  it 
is,  nevertheless,  the  one  raised  in GATT. 
The  other  problem  concerns  the  interval that will  occur 
between  the  progress  on  the  industrial negotiations and  that on 
the agricultural negotiations,  should  the  latter suffer  from  the 
Brussels  crisis.  The  issue at stake  is  of  importance,  for  the 
United States  always  make  the  final  success  in negotiations  de-
pendent  upon  broad  agreement  on agricultural products.  If,  for 
example,  agreement  should  be  reached  on  the  industrial question 
in 1966,  what  would  happen  to  the agricultural question?  Would 
the  United States maintain their prerequisite? If so,  this would 
mean  that there would  be  little chance  of  completing  the  negotia-
tions before  the  expiry  of  the  powers  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States referred to  in the  Trade  Expansion Act.  These 
powers  remain  in force until 30  June  1967  and  the  Government 
will then have  to  ask for  their extension for  a  further number 
of years.  But it will also have  to be  in a  position to  prove  to 
Congress  that substantial progress has  been  made  in Geneva  and 
that there is every reason  to  hope  that general  agreement  -
taking into account American  interests  - may  be  reached  in  a 
not  too  distant future.  No  one  can  forecast what  the  mood  of 
Congress  is likely to be.  It will certainly be  less  favourable 
than at the  time  when  President Kennedy  launched his  famous 
"Atlantic Grand  Design",  based  in part  on  the  Trade  Expansion 
Act. 
This  means  that under  present  circumstances it is obviously 
in the  interest of  the  United States that the  Community  should 
be  in a  position to  submit  serious agricultural proposals  as  soon 
as  possible.  It also  means  that the  United States  do  not wish, 
with regard  to  the  Kennedy  Round,  the Brussels crisis to  go  on 
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and  worsen.  The  American Administration realizes  that as  the  date 
of expiry  of  the  President's  powers  draws  nearer,  it will be 
under  stronger pressure  from  its partners.  (M.O.C.I., 
21  July 1965) 
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PARLIAMENTARY  ACTIVITIES I.  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Activity of  the  Committees  in July 1965 
Political Committee  (l) 
Meeting  of  20  July  in Brussels:  Examination  and  adoption 
of  the  Committee's  Opinion  on  those  parts  of  the  Eighth General 
Report  of  the  EAEC  Commission falling within the  terms  of 
reference  of  the  Committee  (Rapporteur:  Mrs.  Maria  Probst). 
Examination  and  adoption of  the  Committee's  Opinion  on  those 
parts  of  the  Eighth General Report  of  the  EEC  Commission falling 
within the  terms  of  reference  of  the  Committee  (Rapporteur: 
Mr.  Maurice  Faure).  Drawing  up  proposals for  the  Standing 
Committee  of  the  Parliament  on the  problems  of  increasing the 
powers  of  the  Parliament  in view  of  the  forthcoming  colloquy 
between the  Parliament,  the  Councils  of  Ministers,  the  ECSC 
High Authority  and  the  EEC  and  Euratom Commissions.  Examination 
of  the  Committee's  programme  of  work  and  the draft resolutions 
submitted  to  the  Committee  by  Mr.  Birkelbach,  Mr.  Dichgans  and, 
on behalf  of  the  Socialist Group,  by  Mm.  Strobel.  · 
External Trade  Committee  (2) 
Meeting  of  12  July  in Brussels:  Discussion and  adoption 
of  a  draft  working  document  by  Mr.  de  la Malene  on those  parts 
of  the  Eighth Euratom General  Report  that fall within the  terms 
of  reference  of  the  Committee.  The  meeting  was  attended  by 
representatives  of  the  Euratom Commission.  Discussion  and 
adoption of  a  draft  working  document  by  Mr.  Klinker  on those 
parts  of  the  Eighth EEC  General  Report  that fall within the 
terms  of  reference  of  the  Committee.  The  meeting  was  attended 
by representatives  of  the  EEC  Commission.  Discussion with the 
EEC  Commission  on the  GATT  Negotiations  (Kennedy  Round). 
Agricultural  Committee  (3) 
Meeting  of  9  July in Brussels:  Introductory statement  and 
exchange  of  views  with  Mr.  Mansholt,  Vice-President  of  the 
EEC  Commission,  on all the  problems  concerning  the  common 
agricultural  policy. 
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Meeting  of  15-16  July in Brussels:  Examination  and  approval 
of  a  draft report  by  Mr.  Bading  on  a  draft directive  concerning 
measures  to  prevent  the  introduction in Member  States  of  harmful 
organisms for vegetables.  Examination  and  approval  of  a  draft 
opinion by  Mr.  Bading  on  the Eighth General Report  on the 
Activities  of  the  EEC  Commission.  Examination of  a  draft report 
by  Mr.  Vals  on  a  draft regulation in respect  of  quality wines 
produced  in certain regions. 
Social Committee  (4) 
Meeting  of  2  July in Brussels:  Exchange  of  views  with the 
Executive  on  the  EEC  Commission  proposals  in respect  of  social 
measures  to  be  taken  on behalf  of  Italian workers  affected  by 
improvement  operations  carried  out  in sulphur  mines  (Rapporteur: 
Mr.  Vredeling).  Examination  of  a  draft Opinion  on  the  social 
chapters  of  the  Eighth General  Report  on the  Activities  of 
the  EEC  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Krier). 
Meetingsof  12-16  July  in Lower  Saxony  and  Hamburg: 
Fact-finding  and  information mission  on the  reconversion 
carried  out  jointly by  a  delegation of  the  Social Committee 
and  a  delegation of  the  Economic  and  Financial Committee. 
Internal Market  Committee  (5) 
Meeting  of  13  .July  in Brussels:  Examination  of  an 
EEC  Commission  proposal  to  tpe  Council  for  a  second  directive 
to  approximate  turnover  tax legislation in the  Member  States 
on the  basis  of  a  standard  added  value  taxation system;  discussion 
attended  by  the  EEC  Commission  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Seuffert). 
Examination  and  adoption of  a  draft  Opinion by  Mr.  Bersani  on 
those  parts  of  the  EEC  Eighth General  Report  within the  terms 
of  reference  of  the  Committee;  discussion attended  by the 
EEC  Commission.  Examination  of  the  reports  on  competition 
policy submitted  by  Mr.  von der  Groeben  and  Mr.  Linthorst  Homan 
at  the  June  session;  discussion attended  by  the  EEC  Commission 
and  the  High Authority  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Nederhorst). 
Meeting  of  27  July in Munich:  Examination  and  adoption of 
a  draft report  by  Mr.  Illerhaus  on  a  draft  EEC  Commission 
directive  to  introduce  temporary  provisions  in respect  of 
- 36  -European  Parliament 
non-wage  earning activities in retail trade  (Ex  612  ISIC  Group) 
and  on  a  directive  submitted  to  the  Council  to  implement  freedom 
of  establishment  and  freedom  to  supply services under this group. 
Resumption  of  the  study  of  an EEC  Commission  proposal  to  the 
Council  on  a  second directive  concerning  the  approximation  of 
turnover  tax legislation in the  Member  States  in respect  of  the 
structure  and  implementation machinery  of  a  standard  add~d value 
taxation system  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Seuffert). 
Economic  and Financial Committee  (6) 
Meeting  of  21  July in Brussels:, Examination  of  a  draft 
Opinion submitted  by  Mr.  Van  Campen  on  those  parts  of  the 
Eighth EEC  General  Report  that fall wi thir  the  terms  of  reference 
of  the  Committee.  Examination of  an  Opinion submitted  by 
Mr.  Bersani  to the  Internal  Market  Committee  on  a  directive 
concerning  the  approximation of  laws  in the  Member  States  in 
respect  of  turnover  tax,  and  of  a  second  directive  submitted 
by  the  Council  with the  same  end  in view. 
Committee  for Co-operation with Developing Countries  (7) 
Meeting  of  20  July in Brussels:  Examination  and  adoption 
of  a  draft  Opinion by  Mr.  van Hulst  on  those  parts  of  the 
Eighth Euratom General  Report  that fall within the  terms  of 
reference  of  the  Committee.  Examination  and  adoption of  a 
draft  Opinion by  Mr.  Laudrin  on  those  parts  of  the  Eighth 
EEC  General  Report  that fall within the  terms  of  reference 
of  the  Committee. 
Transport  Committee  (8) 
Meeting  of  8  and  9  July in Munich:  Appointment  of 
Mr.  Brunhes  as  rapporteur for  the  Committee's  Opinion  on 
those  parts  of  the Eighth General Report  of  the  EEC  Commission 
falling within the  terms  of reference  of  that  Committee. 
Exchange  of  views  with the  representative  of  the  EEC  Commission 
on  the  outcome  of  the  Council  meeting  of  21  and  22  June  and  on 
prospects  of  further  development. 
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Energy Committee  (9) 
Meeting  of  12  July in Brussels:  Examination  and  approval 
of  a  draft  Opinion  on those  parts  of  the Eighth General  Report 
on  the  Activities  of  the  EEC  Commission falling within the 
terms  of  reference  of  the  Energy  Committee  (Rapporteur: 
Mr.  Scarascia).  Examination  and  adoption of  a  draft  Opinion 
on those  parts  of  the  Eighth General Report  on the  Activities 
of  the  Euratom Commission falling within the  terms  of  reference 
of  the  Energy Committee  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Battaglia).  Statement 
by  the  Euratom  Commission  on the  energy policy implications  of 
the  change  in the  five-year  programme.  Statement  by  the 
Euratom  Commission  on  the  ind.ustrial  guidance  programme 
(Article  40  of  the  Euratom Treaty). 
Research  and  Cultural Affairs  Committee  (10) 
Meeting  of  29  July in Brussels:  Examination  and  approval 
of  the  draft  Opinion drawn up by Mr.  Merten  on Euratolli's 
activities  in connexion with research and  dissemination of 
information.  The  meeting  was  attended  by representatives  of 
the  Euratom Commission.  Examination  and  approval  of  the draft 
Opinion drawn up by  Mr.  Schuijt  on EEC's  activities  in 
connexion with research  and  culture.  The  meeting  was  attended 
by representatives  of  the  EEC  Executive. 
Health  Protection Committee  (ll) 
Meeting  of  19  July in Brussels:  Adoption  of. the draft 
Opinions  drawn up by  Mr.  Santero  on Euratom's  activities,  and 
by  Mr.  Angioy  on the  EEC's  activities  in respect  of  industrial 
safety and  health protection problems. 
Joint  EEC/Greece  Parliamentary Committee 
Meeting  of  15  - 17  July in Berlin:  Submission and  dis-
cussion of  the  second  annual report  on the  work  of  the 
Association Council;  discussion attended  by representatives 
of  the  Association Council.  Examination of  the  second  annual 
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report  of  the-Association Council  and  of  the  working  papers 
submitted  by  Mr.  Tsouderos  and  Mr.  Lucker.  Adoption  of  a 
recommendation to  be  addressed  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
to  the  Greek  Parliament. 
Joint  Committee  of  the  Parliamentary 
Conference  of  the  Association 
Meeting  of  5  - 8  July in Berlin:  Discussion with repre-
sentatives  of  the  Council  of  Association on the  progress  made 
in the first year  on  the  Convention's  implementation.  Discussions 
with representatives  of  the  ECSC  High Authority  and  the  Euratom 
Commission  on the  measures  taken by  these  institutions  in 
pursuance  of  Chapter VI  of  the  Dakar Resolution.  Discussion  on 
questions  concerning  information  on the  Association in the 
Associated  States.  Examination  and  adoption of  a  draft report 
by  Mr.  Guillabert  on  the financial  arrangements  for  the  Con-
ference  in pursuance  of  Article  25  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure. 
Report  by  Mrs.  Strobel  on the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Par-
liamentary Conference  of  the  Association  and  discussion  on this 
report.  Discussion on  the  proposal  by  Mr.  Carboni  that  a  report 
be  made  on research  and  studies  into  common  law  in the  African 
States  and  Madagascar  and  its relationship with statutory law. 
Discussion  on  the  future  working  schedule  of  the  Committee  and 
on  the  date  of  the  next  annual  meeting  of  the  Conference. 
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The  EEC  crisis  as  seen in the  Benelux  countries  - draft 
recommendation by  the  Benelux  Inter-parliamentary 
Consultative  Council 
On  17  July  a  draft  recommendation  on the  crisis  in the 
European Economic  Community  was  tabled  by representatives  of 
the  Christian Democrat  Croups  of  the  three  Benelux  countries 
and  of  the  Socialist  and  Liberal  Groups  in Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands.  The  recommendation read  as  follows: 
11The  recent  crlSlS  in the  European Economic  Community 
has  created  the  impression that  the  three  Benelux countries 
have  not  been  of  one  mind  either in the  talks  leading up  to 
the  crisis  or  in the  attempt  to find  a  solution.  We  consider 
that  it is  the  responsibility and  the  duty  of  the  Benelux 
Inter-parliamentary Consultative  Council  to urge  the  Governments 
of  the  Benelux  countries  to  promote  and  preserve  co-operation 
between  our  countries. 
We  therefore  request  the  Council  to  adopt  the  draft 
recommendation  quoted  below which  appeals  to  the  three  govern-
ments  to deliberate  together  at  all times  and  especially when-
ever  such  circumstances  as  these  make  it requisite  and 
necessary": 
11The  Benelux  Inter-parliamentary Consultative  Council, 
- Regrets  the  lack of  agreement  among  the  Benelux countries 
in the  recent  crisis  in the  European Economic  Community 
and  the  misunderstandings  to  which it has  given rise. 
- Urges  the  three  governments  to consider  what  joint 
measures  may  be  appropriate  in order  to  end  the  crisis 
in the  European Economic  Community  which  is  endangering 
the  future  of  Europe."  (Benelux  Inter-parliamentary 
Consultative  Council,  Doc.  63-l) 
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Germany 
1.  Debate  on  the  direct election of  German  Members 
to  the  European  Parliament 
1.  At  its session of  20  May  1965~  the  Bundestag  proceeded 
to  a  second  and  third reading  of  the bill tabled  by Dr.  Mommer 
and  the  SPD  Group  on  the  election of  German  Members  to  the 
European  Parliament  (1).  The  debate  was  based  on  a  report  by 
the  Committee  for Foreign Affairs  (Third  Committee)  (2).  The 
Rapporteur  was  Dr.  Furler  (CDU). 
On  the  basis  of  a  report  by  the  Committee  for Foreign 
Affairs,  the  Parliament  also discussed  the  following  (3): 
a)  the  FDP  Group  motion  on  parliamentary control  over  the 
European bodies  (4);  b)  the  motion tabled by  some  SPD  Members~ 
with the  support  of  their Group,  on the  democratization of  the 
European Communities  (5);  c)  the  motion tabled  by  some  SPD  Mem-
bers~ with the  support  of  their Group,  on  budgetary control 
over  the  European bodies  (6);  d)  a  SPD  motion  on  promoting 
European co-operation in the  EEC  (7).The  Rapporteur  in each 
case  was  Dr.  Furler  (CDU). 
2.  The  bill on the  election of  German  Members  to  the  European 
Parliament  (tabled  by  Dr.  Mommer  and  the  SPD  Group). 
The  main  purpose  of  the bill was  to  appoint  as  Members 
of  the  European  Parliament  those  Members  of  the  Bundestag that 
have  been returned  by  a  special ballot  on the  federal electoral 
lists on  the  day  of  the  Bundestag  elections;  the  selection to 
comply with the  law  of  proportional representation  (Section  2) 
Only  candidates  who  also stood for election to the  Bundestag 
would  be  eligible  (Section 5,  paragraph 2).  Nominees  could  only 
be  presented  by political parties that were  nation wide  or that 
acquired  this qualification through coalition with other parties 
(Section  8~  paragraph 1). 
(1)  Bundestag~  185th Session,  Document  IV /2338 
(2)  Bundestag  - Document  IV/3130 
(3)  Bundestag  - Document  IV /3129 
(4)  Bundestag  - Document  IV/2091 
(5)  Bundestag  - Document ·IV /2211 
(6)  Bundestag  - Document  r1  j2212 
(7)  Bundestag  - Document  IV/2723 
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Those  candidates  would  be  deemed  elected  who  obtained  a 
mandate  through election by  proportional representation,  pro-
vided  they were  also elected to  the  Bundestag.  Those  elected 
could  opt  not  to sit in the  European  Parliament  and  take  their 
seat  in the  Bundestag  instead.  Acceptance  of  a  seat  in the 
European  Parliament  also entailed  acceptance  of  a  seat  in the 
Bundestag  (Section 13,  paragraph 1).  Similarly,  a  Member  elected 
to  the  European  Parliament  would  lose  his  seat  when  he  ceased 
to  be  a  Member  of  the  Bundestag  or  if he  informed  the  President 
of  the  Bundestag  of his withdrawal  from  the  European  Parliament 
(Section 14). 
Any  seat falling vacant  in the  European  Parliament  would 
have  to  be  filled  through  the  election,  with the  approval  of  the 
retiring Member,  of  a  listed candidate  (Section 15).  In view  of 
the  special  position of Berlin,  the  number  of thirty-six Members 
for  West  Germany  would  be  reduced  to thirty-four so  that  the 
German  delegation to  the  European  Parliament  might  include  two 
Members  from  Land  Berlin  (Section 17). 
In  the  event  of  its being  passed  by  the  Bundestag,  the bill 
shoula  come  into effect for  the  fifth election to  the  Bundestag, 
(September  1965);  when  a  uniform electoral  procedure  were  drawn 
up  in compliance  with the  Treaty  of  Rome,  the bill would  become 
void  (Section 19). 
3.  Jl.t  the  Bundestag  session on  20  May  1965,  Dr.  Furle:::'  com-
mented  on  the  report  of  the  Committee  for Foreign Affairs  (Third 
Comm~ttee) which rejected the bill tabled  by  Dr.  Mommer  and  the 
SPD  Group  on  the  election of  German  IV!embers  to  the  .Ruropean 
Parliament.  The  Committee  gave  two  reasons  for  this: 
a)  Legal  grounds. 
"The  Assembly  shall consist  of  delegates  who  shall  be 
nom:Lnated  by  the  representative  Parliaments  from  0.mong  tr~e ir 
members  in accordance  with the  pioced~re laid  down  in each 
Iv1ember  State. 
11  (Article  138, l  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  Article  ::=:1, l 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  Art~cle 108,1  of  the  Euratom Treaty). 
"Homi nated 
11  here  is  synonymous  wl th  "elected 
11
•  :-lence  f·'1embership 
of  the  European  Parliament  is  only  open  to  Members  of  natioGal 
Parliaments;  it is  the  national  Parliament  that  elects  the 
Me~bers to the  Suropean  Parliament.  The  act  of  election or 
nom.i..nat.Lon  is  fundar.1ental;  the  procedure  involved  is  a  mJ.t+:er 
for  the  Member  States. 
The  development  of  t~e  inter-State  or  supranational  assembly 
h~-;s  'C'IY''-'Jn  tha'::  the  .appc .'..nt:nent  of  Members  to  the  .H:u:::-opean 
Parl~ament rfsultE  from  an  indirect election by  the  nJtional 
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Parliaments;  this  procedure  is half  way  between  appointment  by 
the  Government  and  direct election by  the  people.  Subsequently 
the  appointment  of  Members  by  the  Government  was  replaced  by  an 
election ratified by  the  national  Parliaments. 
The  indirect election of  Members  of  the  Europe-an  Parliament 
through the  national  Parliaments  of  the  Member  States  is  contrary 
to  paragraph 3  of  the  above-mentioned  articles  in the  I1.ome 
Treaties  which  provides  for  "elections  by direct universal 
suffrage 
11
•  The  European  Parliament  is accordingly  "drawing up 
proposals  for  elections  by direct universal  suffrage  in accor-
dance  with  a  uniform  procedure  in all Ulember  States. 
11  The  Council 
shall then  "unanimously decide  on  the  provisions  which  jt shall 
recommend  to  Member  States  for  adoption  in accordance  with their 
respective  constitutional requirements." 
In the  opinion of  the Foreign Affairs  Committee  the  bill 
tabled  (IIf/2338)  did  not  really provide  for  a  composite  procedure, 
i.e.  the  direct election of  German  Members  to  the  European 
Parliament  by universal suffrage,  followed  by their  appointment 
(election)  by  the  Bundestag.  As  the  Bundestag  was  not  free  to 
nominate  Members  to  the  European  Parliament  but  had  to nominate 
Members  elected  by  the  people,  the  procedure  was  not  a  composite 
one;  it was  in fact  a  process  of  direct election.  This  would 
involve  making  the direct election procedure  - ~equired by  the 
Treaty of  Rome  - subject  to national  limitations  and  fundamental 
changes  in form.  Such  a  procedure·,  however,  is not  laid  down  in 
the  Rome  Treaties.  Upon  examitiation,  it was  clear that  this  form 
of  election clashed with the  spirit  and  the  letter of  the 
Treaties.  These  provide  for  two  alternatives,  viz:  the  indirect 
election of delegates  "by  the  respective  Parliaments  from  among 
their membersn  and  "elections  by direct universal  suffrage  in 
accordance  with  a  uniform  procedure  in all Member  States 
11
• 
Direct  elections  must  therefore  be  carried  out  in accordance 
with  na  uniform  procedure  in all the  Member  3tates.
11  These 
alternatives  in the  Treaties  stemmed  from  a  desire  to  make 
direct  elections to  the  European  Parliament  a  European  Community 
procedure.  The  Report  further  stated that  the bill was  not 
designed  to work  out  a  procedure  for  indirect  electi_ons  but 
explicitly provided  a  basis for  the  direct election of  Members 
to  the  European  Parliament. 
Dr.  Furler stated with reference  to  the Report  submitted, 
that  the  Rome  Treaties  made  provisions  for direct  elections  tG 
the  European  Parliament.  Sc_u:;h  direct elections  j_mplied,  hoi-rever, 
that  the  European  ParliameE·r  would  draw  up suitable  proposals. 
Proposals  to this effect  WF. :·e  drawn up  in 1960  and  submit ted  t:o 
the  Council  of Ministers.  ~' ,_)t  the  Treaty required  that  "the 
Council  of  Ministers  shall unanimously decide  on  the  provisionsn; 
the  national  Parliaments  also  had  to ratify them. 
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The  election proposals  were  before  the  Council  of Ministers 
where  they had  encountered  opposition.  To  date  no  decision had 
been taken and  this,  Dr.  Furler  continued,  was  also why  direct 
elections  should  be  held  in one  country. 
b)  Political reasons 
If the  election were  linked with elections to  the  Bundestag, 
it would  lose  its European character.  The  election day would  not 
lead  to  a  European decision to which  considerable  importance  had 
been attached  in the deliberationsof the  European  Parliament. 
He  referred here  to Article 14,1 of  the  European election bill 
which reads:  "Elections to  the  European  Parliament  shall take 
place  on the  same  day  in all the  Member  States;  the date  of  these 
elections shall not  coincide with that  of national elections." 
Dr.  Furler  pointed  out that lif this election coincided with 
that to the  Bundestag,  the  dominant  issues  in the  confrontation 
between the  parties would  be  local  or national  ones. 
It was  furthermore  clear that  the  position of  the  European 
Parliament  would  not  be  strengthened through the direct election 
of  delegates  of  one  or  more  national  groups  but  only through  an 
unqualified European election by universal suffrage.  The  position 
of  Members  of  the  European  Parliament elected directly would  be 
no  stronger.  The  position and  the  capacities  of  the  Members  of 
the  European  Parliament  had  to be  the  same  for all. 
The  Foreign Affairs  Committee  felt that  the bill wou1d  create 
the  following difficulties:  a  candidate  who  was  elected  ~o the 
European  Parliament  but  not  to the Bundestag,  would  not  be  able 
to  take  his  seat  in the European  Parliament.  Under  the bill,  the 
elected  Member  could  opt  not  to sit in the  European  Parliament 
and  take his  seat  in the  Bundestag but  not  vice-versa;  this 
illustrated the  relative  ineffectiveness  of this  method  of 
election.  It furthermore  involved  the  risk that  the  purpose  and 
political significance  of  elections  by direct universal suffrage 
would  be  lost  to  the  European  Parliament,  if the  Member  States 
proceeded  along different  lines. 
For these  reasons  the  Committee  proposed  to the  Bundestag 
that  the bill be  rejected  (Document  IV/23388).  At  the  same  time, 
however,  the  Committee  said it was  in favour  of  general European 
elections being held  in pursuance  of  the Treaty of  Rome  and  it 
trusted that  the  German  Government  would  adopt  the  relevant 
proposals ,for  an electoral law. 
- 46  -National  Parliaments 
4.  The  debate  on this  issue  was  opened  by Dr.  Mommer  (SPD) 
who  stated that despite  the  great difficulties encountered  in 
uni  tir.g Europe  economically,  considerable  progress  had  been  made. 
Unfortunately,  parts  of  European structure were still under-
developed,  namely  the  democratic  aspects  and  the  democratic  and 
parliamentary substructure  of  the  European institutions.  He 
criticized the  lack of  progress  on this  point,  especially in 
connexion with the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament.  It had  to 
be  a  real  Parliament  and  directly elected by  the  people  or 
peoples  of  Europe  it represented,  in compliance  with Article  138 
of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
Dr.  Mommer  defended his  proposals  by  pointing  out  that 
European  policy had  to be  one  of  gradualism.  This  was  axiomatic 
if the  principle that  peace  was  the first duty  of  the  European 
were  to  be  followed;  and  if the  question of  parliamentary rights 
were  not  to  fade  into oblivion.  A  gradualist  policy was  therefore 
necessary because  at  present  no  major decision could  be  carried 
through,  in view  of  the  fact  that  the  Head  of  State  of  one  of  the 
six countries  opposed  integration.  Dr.  Mommer  regarded  the 
rejection of  the bill by  the  Coalition Group  as  inspired  by the 
fear  of  doing  anything that  might  incur the  displeasure  of  the 
French Head  of  State.  The  spokesman for  the  SPD  regarded  this 
as  the underlying thread  of  the Government's  policy;  he  further 
asserted that  in previous  years,  the  defence  of  the  German  stand-
point  and  interests  in opposition to the  General  had  been too 
faint-hearted.  "When  it comes  to European affairs it should  be 
possible  for us  to  oppose  his  creed  - the  creed  of  nationalism 
and  of  absolute  and unrestricted sovereignty  - by  putting forward 
the European  creed;  we  should  do  this  as  often and  as  pointedly 
as  may  be  necessary.  Although  de  Gaulle  now  stands  alone  in 
Europe  he  has  no  fear  of  expressing his  conviction against  in-
tegration,  either in Europe  or within the  Atlantic  framework." 
Professor Kopf  of  the  CDU/CSU  Group  pointed  out  that  the 
point  of  direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  was  that 
this  should  be  a  Community  act.  There  should  not  be  direct 
elections  in one  State  only but  in all Member  S-tates  simul-
taneously.  In this  connexion  he  regretted that  the  Working  Party 
of  the  European  Parliament  that  had  already spent  a  year working 
out  a  common  election procedure  had still not  been successful  in 
finalizing this.  Individual  countries  were  still too  closely 
attached  to their  own  electoral traditions  and  the  purpose  of 
the bill before  the  Bundestag was  to  introduce  the  principle  of 
direct election to  the  European  Parliament.  He  quoted  Article  14 
of  the  European Election Bill from  which it was  quite  clear that 
national elections  should  not  coincide with elections  to the 
European  Parliament.  This  was  a  desirable distinction for  the 
special character of  the  Community  Act  had  to be  taken into 
account. 
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Baron von  Mlihlen  (FDP)  returned  to the  proposal  put 
forward  by Dr.  Mommer  to  the effect that  a  gradualist  policy 
in European affairs  should  be  pursued.  For  Germany  alone  to 
proceed  to  the  election of  its Members  to the  European  Parliament 
would  however  be  a  "major stride";  in taking it, Germany  would 
be  acting  out  of turn. 
Mrs.  Strobel said  on behalf  of  the  SPD  Group that  the 
intention of her party in submitting the bill had  been to 
couple  the  election of  German  Members  to the  European  Parliament 
with elections to the  Bundestag  so that the  electorate would  be 
directly involved  in the  forme~ Better grounds  for  German 
Members  sitting in the  European  Parliament  were  needed  and  at 
the  same  time  an  example  had  to  be  given that  might  accelerate 
the direct election of  the  European  Parliament. 
Professor Burgbacher  (CDU/CSU)  felt  that all parties 
represented  in the  Bundestag wanted  to  accelerate  political 
integration and  to  increase  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament. 
Yet  his  Group  had  doubts  about  the  SPD  proposal  in this  con-
nexion because  the  parliamentary elections  involved  would  not 
tally with the electorate's  idea of  what  a  Parliament  should  be. 
He  feared  that  when  the  general  public  came  to discuss  these 
elections  they would  ask  "what  are  we  electing them for,  what 
have  they got  to say,  what  can they do?"  So  that  this  would  do 
more  harm  than good. 
Mr.  Carstens,  Secretary of  State  at  the  German Foreign 
Office  said at  the  close  of  the  debate  that  the Federal  Govern-
ment  was  opposed  to  the  idea of  one  individual  country directly 
electing its Members  to the  European  Parliament.  For  this would 
mean  abandoning  the  principle  of  "a uniform  procedure".  The 
German  Government  was  nonetheless  in favour  of  strengthening the 
powers  of  the  European  Parliament  and  would  bring this matter 
up  again after the  merger  of  the  Executives  when discussing the 
merger  of  the  three  Communities.  The  motion  of  the  SPD  Group 
was  rejected  by  the  CDU/CSU  in coalition with the  FDP.  (Bundestag, 
3rd  term l85th session,  20  May  1965) 
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2.  Ratification of  the Treaty merging  the  European Executives 
At  its session of  30  June  1965  (194th Session)  the  Bundestag 
gave  a  second  and  third reading  (1)  to the  German  Government  bill 
concerning the Treaty of  8  April  1965  establishing  a  single 
Council  and  a  single  Commission in the  European Communities  (2). 
The  basis for  the debate  was  a  written report  by the 
Committee  for Foreign Affairs  (Third Committee)  (3).  The  Rappor-
teur was  Dr.  Furler  (CDU). 
During  the  same  debate  the  Bundestag discussed  the 
EEC  Commission  proposals  of  31  March  1965  (4)  on financing  the 
agricultural  policy df  the  European Economic  Community.  The 
basis for  this debate  was  an  oral report  by  the  Budget  Committee 
(Thirteenth Committee).  The  Rapporteur  was  Mr.  Windelen. 
Dr.  Furler  of  the  CDU/CSU  and  Rapporteur  for  the  Committee 
for Foreign Affairs  (Third  Committee)  stated that  the  merger  of 
the  Councils  and  Executives  of  the  European Communities  was  a 
significant  advance  towards  European integration.  It was  clear 
that with only  one  Commission  in the  place  of  three  and  only 
one  Council  in the  place  of  three  Councils  of  Ministers  there 
would  be  a  concentration of  strength and  a  vigorous  rationali-
sation of  the  administrative  apparatus.  The  single Commission 
would  have  greater executive  power.  Dr.  Furler  indicated that 
his  Group would  support  the bill although it regretted that the 
opportunity afforded by the  merger  to strengthen the  position 
of  the  European  Parliament  had  not  been  put  to  advantage.  It 
was  unfortunate  that  there  had  been  a  certain weakening  in the 
position of  the  European  Parliament,  for  as  a  result  of  the 
merger  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament  lost his right 
to  a  say in regard  to  the  budget  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community. 
It was  true  that hitherto the  President  could  not  force  the 
budget  through but  he  could  impose  a  veto.  The  ECSC  budget  could 
not  be  passed without  the  approval  of  the  President  of  the 
European  Parliament.  This  had  been struck out  and  it had  been 
suggested  that  the  Parliament  would  now  have  the  opportunity to 
discuss  the  common  budget  and  play its part  in this way.  This 
form  of  co-operation,  however,  carried  no  legal obligation; 
(1) First reading,  l89th Session 
(2)  Bundestag  Publication IV/3530 
(3)  Bundestag  Publication IV/3635 
(4)  Bundestag  Publications  IV/3313  and  3665 
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it was  merely  a  consultative function.  Dr.  Furler said that 
he  was  convinced that his  arguments  were  sound.  There  had  been 
a  long  struggle  to  persuade  others but it had  been unsuccessful. 
Mr.  Wehner  (SPD)  referring to what  the  previous  speaker 
had  said,  spoke  of  a  definite deterioration in the  position of 
the  Parliament  through its losing  one  of  its basic rights.  It 
had  to  agree  to this if it were  not  to wreck  the  whole  under-
taking.  He  described this  as  a  strange  situation for  the  wholly 
inadequate  powers  of  the  Parliament  were  now  being diminished 
instead  of  being  increased.  While  the  Social Democrat  Group  of 
the  Bundestag  would  support  th~ bill and  endorse  the  report  and 
the  resolution appended  thereto,  it felt,  nevertheless,  that  one 
of  the unfortunate results  of  the  merger  would  be  that  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  Members  of  the  Executive  would  have 
much  more  power  than the  representatives  of  the  people,  who  had 
themselves  agreed  to having  even less  to  say.  This  was  particular-
ly deplorable  since  the  undertaking was  a  Community  one  in which, 
through the unification of  Europe,  freedom,  law,  democracy  and 
parliament  should  be  strenghtened  and  brought  into sharper focus. 
Mr.  Rademacher  of  the  FDP  referred to the  point  that  after 
the  merger  of  the  three  bodies  "only  one  voice  would  be  heard". 
On  the  basis  of  the  experience  of  the  European  Parliament  he 
considered this dubious.  He  felt that  as  long  as  the  decisive 
step  - merging  the  Treaties  - were  not  actually taken,  it was 
hardly to  be  expected that  the  Commission  or  the  Council  would 
be  able  to  speak with  one  voice  for  all three  bodies. 
Mr.  Rademacher  found  it extraordinary that  a  special group had 
grown up  in the  European  Parliament  that  constituted  an  opposition 
in itself. There  had  been to begin with three  Groups  in the 
European  Parliament,  each of  which  comprised  Members  from  all 
the  six countries.  Then  a  national group  - the Gaullists  -had 
sprung up  as  a  result  of  a  rather extraordinary  "adjustment"  in 
Paris.  He  asked  whether  it were  consistent with the  spirit  and 
sense  of  European integration for  the  European  Parliament  to 
have  in its midst  such national  groups. 
Mr.  Illerhaus  (CDU/CSU)  also expressed his regret  that  the 
opportunity afforded  by the  merger  of  the  Executives  had  not  been 
seized upon to  strengthen the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament. 
The  merger  had  been welcomed  by all  Member  States but  it had 
created  enormous  difficulties.  He  referred  to  the  question of 
the  seat,  the  question of  Luxembourg~ etc.  All  those  who  advocated 
stronger  powers  for  the  European  Parliament  asked  whether  they 
should  endorse  the  merger  of  the  Executives,  since it would  be 
impossible  on this  occasion to strengthen the  powers  of  the 
Parliament?  All  the  groups  had  regretted that  the  powers  of  the 
Parliament  had  not  been  strengthened~ yet  it was  generally agreed 
- 50  -National  Parliaments 
that  the  merger  of  the Executives  should  not  be  held up because 
of  this.  Mr.  Illerhaus described  the  merger  of  the  Executives 
as  a  first step towards  a  merger  of  the  Communities.  Replying 
to Mr.  Rademacher,  he  said  that  the  new  Executive  should  have 
the  task of  preparing  a  merger  of  the  Communities  and  of  the 
Treaties.  He  added:  "If we  hope  to  achieve  this  in a  few  years' 
time  then the  Federal Government  and,  indeed,  all of  us  - in my 
opinion  - should  realize  that it would  be  the  very last  op-
portunity,  I  repeat,  the  very last opportunity,  to  increase  the 
powers  of  the  European  Parliament." 
Mr.  Carstens,  Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs,  said 
that  the  attitude  of  the Federal Government  on the  question of 
strengthening the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament  was  quite 
unequivocal.  For years it had  been the  German  Government  that 
had  focused  attention on this  problem  and  its solution.  He 
recalled that  during the Treaty negotiations  from  1955-1957  the 
German delegation had  done  all in its  power  to  place  the  European 
Parliament  in a  strong position.  He  agreed  with previous  speakers 
that  two  opportunities  would  arise when  it might  be  possible  to 
strengthen the  powers  of  the  Parliament:  a)  when  the  Community 
had  independent  revenues  and  b)  when  the  merger  of  the  Communities 
themselves  were  tackled.  "These  would  provide  the  only  opportu-
nities for  pressing for  stronger  powers  for  the  European  Parlia-
ment  and  the  German  Government  was  ready  and  prepared  to do  this." 
Merging  the  Executives  of  the  European Communities  was  an  im-
portant step;  it involved  no  fundamental  change  in the  situation 
but  it was  a  rationalisation that  would  strengthen the  European 
Communities. 
The  Bundestag  passed  the bill, with  one  vote  against. 
The  Bundesrat  debated  the bill on the Treaty of  8  April  1965 
establishing  a  single Council  and  a  single  Commission  in the 
European Communities  (1)  on  4  June  1965  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Lemmer). 
The  discussion in the  Bundesrat  was  used  mainly  as  an 
opportunity to reiterate the  desire  of  that  body to be  represented 
on  the  Council  of  Europe  and  in the  European  Parliament.  The  bill 
was  passed unanimously  by  the  Bundesrat  on  16  July 1965. 
(Bundestag,  194th Session,  30  June  1965;  Bundesrat,  283rd  Session, 
4  June  1965) 
(1)  Bundesrat  Publication 253/65 
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Netherlands 
Statement  by  Mr.  Luns  to the First Chamber  of  the 
States-General 
In  a  note  issued  on  16  July in connexion with the  final 
report  of  the Rapporteurs'  Committee  dealing with the Foreign 
Affairs  appropriation in the  Dutch budget  (Section V)  for  the 
current  financial year,  Mr.  Luns  stated that  the  EEC  Council  of 
Ministers'  session of  28  and  30  June  and  the  measures 
subsequently taken by  the French Government  had  given rise to 
a  situation fraught  with difficulties.  There  was  therefore 
neither virtue  nor value  in subjecting to detailed analysis  the 
attitudes  adopted  by  the  Netherlands  and  the  other  Member  States. 
As  to whether  economic  integration could  proceed  without 
agreement  being reached  on specific political issues,  Mr.  Luns 
said that this  was  not  a  new  problem.  His  view  was  that  even 
serious  disagreement  on external  or·  defence  policy need  not 
necessarily hold  in check  the  growth  of  the  Common  Market. 
The  de  facto  solidarity envisioned  by  the  authors  of  the 
Treaties  of  Rome  was  furthermore  becoming  a  reality and  there 
had  been so  many  shifts  in the  European focus  that  no  Member 
State  could  afford  not  to recognize  their far-reaching 
implications. 
This  was  why  Mr.  Luns  said he  had  always  emphatically 
disputed  the  contention that  the  Common  Market  would  remain 
unfinished unless  and until the right political conditions 
obtained;  the  Treaty,  he  added,  had  made  no  reference  to  any 
such conditions. 
These  factors  were  indeed  operative  when it came  to 
assessing  how  far disagreement  as  to the  nature  and  aims  of 
European co-operation could  affect  t~e growth  of  the  EEC.  It 
could  not  be  denied that  such  disag~eements were  of  long 
standing  or that their root  cause  was  the  diffidence  of  the 
French Government  about  the  principles  and  objectives under-
lying the Treaties  of  Paris  and  Rome.  To  date,  co-operation 
had  not  suffered unduly  from  such disagreements  - proof  that 
the edifice built  on the  Treaties  was  a  house  for all seasons. 
The  current  crisis,  touched  off  by  the  question of  financing 
the  common  agricultural  policy,  might  be  read  to  mean  that  we 
were  confronted with  an entirely new  situation where  the 
machinery  of  the Treaties  and  the  decision-taking  procedures 
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that  followed  from  them fell short  when  it came  to  smoothing 
over the  clash of  opinions.  But  the  Dutch  Government  felt it 
would  be  premature  to draw  such  a  conclusion.  It still believed 
a  solution could  be  found  to the  question  of  financing  the 
common  agricultural  policy  and  the  problems  of  independent 
revenues  and  parliamentary control  and  that  the  Community  would 
be  able  to  resume  its forward  progress.  (First  Chamber  of  the 
States-General,  1964-65,  Session No.  110) 
- 53  -